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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the main drivers of the 
ECB’s balance sheet and proﬁ  t and loss account 
over the ﬁ  rst 11 years of the ECB’s existence. 
Furthermore, the paper assesses the ﬁ  nancial 
strength of the ECB. As monetary policy 
operations are normally conducted by national 
central banks under the impulse and instructions 
from the ECB, the Eurosystem balance sheet 
is the primary reference for the analysis of 
Eurosystem monetary policy operations.
Three main drivers of the balance sheet and 
proﬁ   t and loss account are identiﬁ  ed.  Firstly, 
ﬁ   nancial market developments and portfolio 
management decisions imply changes in the 
value of the foreign reserve and own funds 
portfolios, which represent a substantial part of 
the balance sheet (with the share of own funds 
becoming increasingly larger over the period 
under review). At the same time, the proﬁ  t and 
loss account depends to an important degree 
on interest income and expenses, realised gains 
and losses, and write-downs on these portfolios. 
Secondly, strong banknote demand has 
gradually increased the size of the balance sheet 
since the euro changeover in 2002. Banknotes 
in circulation also provide a strong base for 
seigniorage income, which is an important 
item of the proﬁ   t and loss account. Thirdly, 
the liquidity-providing operations in foreign 
currency, which the Eurosystem has undertaken 
since 2007 in response to the ﬁ  nancial  crisis, 
increased signiﬁ   cantly the size of the ECB’s 
(and the Eurosystem’s) balance sheet. In terms 
of income and expenses, these operations were 
rather immaterial at the level of the ECB, 
although the income generated was substantial at 
the Eurosystem level.
The ECB has remained ﬁ  nancially  strong 
over the 11-year period. Factors that support 
the  ﬁ   nancial position are strong legislative 
provisions on e.g. independence and income, the 
use of ﬁ  nancial buffers, seigniorage as a reliable 
income source and an effective loss-coverage 
mechanism. The main risk stems from adverse 
ﬁ  nancial market developments, in particular low 
interest rates and depreciating foreign reserve 
currencies, implying security price and currency 
write-downs.
Key words: central banking, central bank balance 
sheet, ﬁ  nancial accounts, ﬁ  nancial strength
JEL classiﬁ  cation: E58, E42, M415
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This paper identiﬁ   es and analyses the main 
drivers of the ECB’s balance sheet and proﬁ  t 
and loss account over the ﬁ  rst 11 years of ECB 
existence. Furthermore, the ﬁ  nancial  strength 
of the ECB is assessed. As monetary policy 
operations are normally conducted by national 
central banks under the impulse and instructions 
from the ECB, the Eurosystem balance sheet 
is the primary reference for the analysis of 
Eurosystem monetary policy operations.
Three main drivers have been identiﬁ  ed  for 
the balance sheet developments and proﬁ  t/loss:
ﬁ   nancial market developments and portfolio 
management, the special operations 
implemented during the ﬁ   nancial crisis, and 
banknote issuance. The following ﬁ  ndings were 
made concerning their impact on the balance 
sheet items:
Financial market developments and portfolio    •
management decisions led to signiﬁ  cant 
changes in the value of foreign currency 
assets and euro-denominated assets. 
For foreign currency assets, a decomposition 
of the changes into volume and exchange rate 
effects has been made. Prominent volume 
effects were the EUR/USD exchange rate 
intervention in 2000, gold sales during 
2005-09, and the gradual rebalancing in 
favour of the Japanese yen portfolio. 
Important exchange rate effects resulted 
from the long period of US dollar and 
Japanese yen depreciation, the strong 
rise in the gold price since 2005, and the 
strong Japanese yen appreciation in 2008. 
These developments also offset each other 
occasionally, e.g. the strong increase in the 
gold price helped to offset the depreciation 
of the US dollar portfolio (in EUR terms) in 
the second half of the 11-year period.
Valuation gains are prudently recorded in 
revaluation accounts in accordance with 
the ESCB/Eurosystem accounting rules, 
preventing potentially temporary unrealised 
gains arising from favourable exchange 
rate developments are taken as income 
(and distributed). The use of revaluation 
accounts proved useful, as certain revaluations 
were indeed temporary, in particular for the 
US dollar holdings.
The size of the ECB’s own funds portfolio, 
which is invested in euro-denominated assets 
and is thus not subject to exchange rate risk, 
increased strongly over time due mainly to 
inﬂ  ows from the investment of the ECB risk 
provision into the own funds, but also from 
the reinvestment of the income generated 
over the years.
The liquidity-providing operations in foreign    •
currency, which the ECB has undertaken 
since 2007 as a response to the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, tripled the size of the ECB balance 
sheet by end-2008 and gradually faded out 
in 2009. The increase relates mainly to the 
euro leg of USD-EUR operations in which 
the ECB intermediated between the Federal 
Reserve and the Eurosystem national 
central banks (NCBs). The NCBs provided 
dollars to Eurosystem monetary policy 
counterparties as part of the Eurosystem’s 
liquidity-providing operations. On the asset 
side, the settlement of the transactions with 
the NCBs increased the ECB’s “other 
claims within the Eurosystem (net)” by 
about €217 billion. On the liabilities side, 
the euro part of the swap transactions 
with the Federal Reserve did not settle, 
but remained “liabilities to non-euro area 
residents denominated in euro”. The size 
of the operations with other central banks 
was much smaller and totalled on average 
€34 billion in late 2008.
The ECB banknote issuance has increased    •
the ECB balance sheet gradually over time 
since 2002. Strong demand for euro 
banknotes boosted the total euro banknote 
issuance (tripling the stock over the 
period 2002-09), of which 8% is assigned 
to the ECB.6
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The following ﬁ  ndings were made concerning 
the impact of three (actual and potential) drivers 
on the proﬁ  t and loss account items:
Seigniorage income proved to be a reliable    •
income source in the long run. Seigniorage 
contributed increasingly to ECB interest 
income, reaching €2,230 million in 2008, 
some 84% of the surplus before any transfer 
to the risk provision. However, seigniorage 
income signiﬁ   cantly depends on the level 
of the interest rate on the main reﬁ  nancing 
operations (marginal MRO rate) and fell 
markedly to €787 million in 2009.
Financial market developments and portfolio    •
management had an important impact on 
the ﬁ  nancial result through three channels. 
First, write-downs due to exchange rate 
developments, which were strong in 2003-04 
and 2007, ranging between €2 billion and 
€4 billion. Second, realised gains, which were 
occasionally signiﬁ  cant due to the exchange 
rate intervention in 2000 (€2.5 billion), and 
gold sales between 2005 and 2009. Third, 
net interest income (excluding seigniorage 
income), which depends on the interest rate 
gap between mainly the US interest rates and 
the euro area marginal MRO rate.
The liquidity-providing operations in foreign    •
currency are a factor that in principle could 
have an impact on the ﬁ  nancial result, but the 
actual impact has been minor for the ECB up 
to the end of 2009.
The  ﬁ   nancial crisis in general brought    •
favourable revaluation developments 
reﬂ  ecting the fact that ECB portfolios are 
mostly invested in high-quality ﬁ  xed-income 
instruments and exchange rate developments 
were overall favourable, but seigniorage 
dropped due to lower interest rates.
The assessment of the ECB’s ﬁ  nancial strength 
led to the following conclusions:
The ECB remained ﬁ  nancially  strong    •
throughout the 11-year period. The ECB 
pursues  ﬁ   nancial strength to be able to 
credibly commit to its price stability objective 
and credibly perform other potentially costly 
tasks relating to its general mandate. Strong 
legislative provisions providing ﬁ  nancial 
independence and transparency on ECB 
income acted as a strong base to protect 
the  ﬁ   nancial position. Furthermore, the 
ﬁ  nancial buffers sufﬁ  ced for the purpose of 
absorbing a ﬁ  nancial loss, thereby protecting 
paid-up capital, except in 2004 when a loss 
of €1.3 billion was offset against Eurosystem 
monetary income. Financial losses were 
offset mainly through the risk provision, 
partly because it can be built up faster than 
the general reserve mechanism. In addition, 
the  ﬁ   nancial result was increasingly 
supported by seigniorage income, whilst 
the ESCB accounting rules, particularly the 
principle of prudence, also prevented the 
ECB from incurring even greater losses in 
periods of depreciating currencies through 
the use of revaluation accounts for recording 
unrealised gains.
Although the ﬁ  nancial position of the ECB    •
remained strong, the 11-year experience has 
pointed out some risks. Financial market 
developments have posed the biggest threat 
mainly through exchange rate risk, which 
resulted in signiﬁ  cant write-downs at times. 
This exposure is likely to test the ﬁ  nancial 
buffers again in the future. Furthermore, 
seigniorage became an important factor, 
but would be signiﬁ  cantly lower in the near 
future despite strong banknote demand if 
the level of the marginal MRO rate were to 
remain low. 7
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I   INTRODUCTION
1 INTRODUCTION
Since the European Central Bank (ECB) 
was founded on 1 June 1998 and the euro 
was launched in January 1999, the ECB and 
the Eurosystem have faced some daunting 
challenges. In particular, as a new institution, 
the ECB had to gain credibility and win the 
conﬁ   dence of the public and the ﬁ  nancial 
markets that it would maintain price stability. 
The Protocol on the Statute of the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the 
European Central Bank provided the ECB with 
ﬁ  nancial means: capital, foreign reserve assets, 
monetary income as a means of covering 
ﬁ  nancial losses and explicit proﬁ  t distribution 
rules with the possibility to build up a general 
reserve fund. These legislative provisions 
aimed to support the ECB in performing 
its tasks, in particular conducting monetary 
policy. Proﬁ  t generation is not the main aim, 
and also the balance sheet structure and proﬁ  t 
and loss account items are quite different from 
those of private ﬁ  nancial institutions.
A number of factors affected the ﬁ  nancial 
situation of the ECB through the years. 
Moreover, there was an awareness that the 
successful execution of its tasks may depend 
on solid ﬁ  nancial resources. Over the years, the 
ECB grew as an institution, both in size and 
reputation. It developed new activities and saw 
new EU Member States adopting the euro. On its 
balance sheet, the ECB held foreign reserves 
of which the ﬁ   nancial market exposure could 
weigh materially on the ﬁ  nancial result through 
write-downs. The transfer of the foreign 
reserves from the Eurosystem national central 
banks (NCBs) generated a remunerated, 
EUR-denominated claim of the NCBs on the 
ECB. Therefore, this transfer resulted in the ECB 
being exposed to the interest rate gap between 
the interest earned on investments (mainly 
in USD) and the interest paid on the foreign 
reserves to the NCBs (in EUR). Since 2002, 
the ECB interest income was further supported 
by seigniorage, i.e. the interest income arising 
from the allocation of euro banknotes within the 
Eurosystem. However, with a young currency 
such as the euro, the future path of the banknote 
component of seigniorage was unclear initially. 
Starting in mid-2007, in a period of ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, the Eurosystem undertook foreign currency 
liquidity-providing operations and also lent euro 
to other central banks. Reﬂ   ecting the internal 
allocation of tasks within the Eurosystem, the 
ECB engaged in a number of transactions related 
to these exceptional operations, which affected 
its balance sheet. 
This paper analyses the main drivers of the 
ECB  ﬁ   nancial accounts over the ﬁ  rst  11 
years up to December 2009. In particular, the 
main drivers of the ECB balance sheet items 
and of ECB proﬁ   t and loss are analysed. 
Furthermore, the ﬁ   nancial buffers and their 
smoothing function are presented. Finally, the 
need for ﬁ   nancial strength is discussed and 
the ﬁ  nancial strength of the ECB is assessed. 
In this last part, the paper takes a step back 
from the ﬁ   nancial accounts and discusses 
the macroeconomic relevance of central bank 
ﬁ  nancial accounts, in particular in the context 
of the ECB and the Eurosystem.
Three drivers of the ECB balance sheet are 
analysed. Firstly, the effect of ﬁ  nancial market 
developments on the foreign reserve holdings 
is analysed. Secondly, the impact of the special 
liquidity operations (in foreign currency and in 
euro) in which the ECB participated during the 
2007-09 ﬁ  nancial crisis is studied. Thirdly, the 
ECB banknote issuance is discussed. 
Three drivers of ECB income and expenditures 
are examined. First, the dynamics of seigniorage 
income are analysed. Second, the impact of 
ﬁ  nancial market developments on the ﬁ  nancial 
result is pointed out. Third, a check is made for 
the effects of the ﬁ  nancial crisis on the proﬁ  t 
and loss account. 
The ECB’s ﬁ   nancial strength is assessed 
starting from the deﬁ   nition of Stella (2008) 
where  ﬁ   nancial strength is used to describe 
“the extent to which an entity is constrained by 
its  ﬁ  nancial situation in pursuing its strategic 
goals or policies. An entity is ﬁ  nancially strong 8
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when it is relatively unconstrained and weak 
when ﬁ  nancial constraints are binding on policy 
choices.” Before assessing the ECB’s ﬁ  nancial 
strength, the case for ﬁ  nancial strength in the 
context of a central bank is summarised based 
on results in the literature. Next, a number 
of components of ECB ﬁ   nancial strength are 
presented. Finally, the risks to a central bank’s 
ﬁ  nancial strength are listed and related to the 
ECB experience. 
Section 2 analyses the main drivers of ECB 
balance sheet items. Section 3 analyses the 
main drivers of ECB proﬁ  t and loss. Section 4 
discusses the ECB’s ﬁ  nancial strength.9
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2   MAIN DRIVERS 
OF ECB BALANCE 
SHEET ITEMS
2  MAIN DRIVERS OF ECB BALANCE SHEET 
ITEMS
This section presents three main drivers of ECB 
balance sheet developments. First, ﬁ  nancial 
market developments and portfolio management 
decisions were an important factor, which led 
to changes in the composition and values of 
the foreign reserve and own funds portfolios. 
The foreign reserve portfolio developments are 
analysed making a distinction between exchange 
rate and volume effects. Furthermore, the use 
of revaluation accounts in handling changes 
in market valuation is explained. The liquidity 
operations in which the ECB intermediated 
to provide foreign currency to Eurosystem 
counterparties and euro to other central banks 
were a second driver. A closer look is taken at 
the increase in the level of the balance sheet that 
took place at the end of 2008. A third driver was 
ECB banknote issuance, which has increased 
strongly over time and expanded the balance 
sheet gradually. An overview of the annual 
balance sheet during the period 1998-2009 is 
given in the Appendix.
2.1  FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 
AND MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN RESERVES
The foreign reserve holdings of the ECB comprise 
gold and net assets in foreign currency, which 
are items of considerable size on the balance 
sheet. One important reason is the decentralised 
set-up of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy 
implementation, which leaves the monetary 
policy operations on the NCB balance sheets 
only. The foreign reserve holdings enable the 
ECB to conduct foreign exchange operations, 
which is one of its basic tasks. The size of these 
holdings is affected by interventions on the 
foreign exchange market and decisions relating to 
the ECB foreign reserve management. The value 
depends on asset price movements. The euro 
equivalent of the foreign reserve holdings 
depends on exchange rate developments for the 
underlying assets. 
The ECB also manages its own funds, i.e. its 
paid-up capital and reserves. The own funds 
are invested in euro-denominated assets and the 
value of that portfolio also depends on asset price 
movements. First, the ECB foreign reserves are 
analysed. Second, the developments in the own 
funds are discussed.
2.1.1 FOREIGN RESERVE HOLDINGS
The foreign reserve holdings of the Eurosystem 
central banks are signiﬁ   cant compared with 
other central banks. The share of foreign 
reserves represented 66% of ECB total assets 
in 1999, down to 35% by 2006 as other items 
grew; in particular, banknotes were added to the 
total in 2002 and grew strongly thereafter.
Chart 1 shows how the total euro equivalent 
varied between €35 billion and €50 billion 
Chart 1 US dollar, Japanese yen and gold portfolio in euro equivalent
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and how changes in the underlying assets 
caused these movements. At the start, 15% of 
the holdings were in gold and the remaining 
part was composed of 90% in US dollars and 
10% in Japanese yen. Charts 2 to 4 present the 
developments in the US dollar, Japanese yen and 
gold holdings, respectively. Each chart has four 
panels showing the foreign reserve volume, the 
exchange rate, the euro equivalent of the holdings 
and a decomposition of the changes in the euro 
equivalent into volume and exchange rate and 
gold price (hereafter “price”) components. The 
decomposition is explained in the Appendix.
Firstly, the volume effects are discussed. 
Secondly, the exchange rate and gold price 
developments are summarised and then the joint 
effects are discussed.
VOLUME DEVELOPMENTS
At the beginning of 1999, the ECB foreign 
reserves consisted of about USD 35 billion, 
JPY 445 billion and 24 million ounces of gold. 
The amounts changed somewhat when the 
capital key, which determines the contribution 
of each ESCB member, changed or an EU 
Member State adopted the euro. However, 
these structural breaks were small and there are 
a number of more important reasons why the 
volume of reserves changed. 
Intervention
The main reason why central banks keep foreign 
exchange reserves is for potential interventions 
on the currency markets, usually to support 
their own currency. The ECB intervened in the 
foreign exchange market in the autumn of 2000. 
Chart 2 US dollar holdings
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2   MAIN DRIVERS 
OF ECB BALANCE 
SHEET ITEMS
The reason was the continuous depreciation of the 
euro since the beginning of 1999, which caused 
concern about potential misalignments as the 
exchange rate appeared out of line with euro area 
fundamentals. In particular, the potential adverse 
impact on the world economy and price stability 
in the euro area raised concern. Therefore, the 
ECB took the initiative for concerted central bank 
intervention in exchange markets together with 
the monetary authorities of the United States and 
Japan in September 2000 and on its own initiative 
in November 2000. These interventions explain 
the drop in dollar and yen reserve volumes 
at end-2000 (see Charts 2(a) and 3(a)). Soon 
after, the yen reserves were restored by buying 
yen against dollars.
Gold sales
Since 1999, the ECB has been signatory of the 
Central Bank Gold Agreement (CBGA), which 
aims to limit the effect of gold sales on the gold 
price, by putting a ceiling on the sales of gold. 
According to the CBGA the signatory central 
banks agreed to sell up to 400 tonnes annually 
during 1999-2004 and up to 500 tonnes annually 
during 2004-2009. The ECB, like some NCBs, 
engaged in gold sales within those limits during 
the latter period, as Chart 4(a) shows. Slightly 
attenuated by contributions by new euro area 
countries, the decline of the gold volume 
amounted 33% or 246 tonnes less compared to 
the ECB’s initial holding in January 1999 by 
end-2009.
A general argument for selling gold is that it 
is not interest-bearing, incurs a storage cost 
and cannot be liquidated quickly in case of 
liquidity needs. These disadvantages have 
to be weighed against the fact that it offers 
a way of diversifying away from currency 
Chart 3 Japanese yen holdings
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holdings. For example, the rising gold price 
helped to counter the impact of the depreciating 
US dollar over the period from 2005 to 2008. 
Gold also offers a hedge against inﬂ  ation  in 
contrast to money. Furthermore, it is seen as 
a safe investment in times of distress and gold 
is expected to remain generally accepted and 
traded in quite a liquid market.
The proceeds from the ECB’s gold sales were 
invested mainly in Japanese yen, which helps to 
explain the sharp increase in the Japanese yen 
reserves shown in Chart 3(a). 
Rebalancing
In 1999, the dollar reserves and yen reserves 
represented respectively 90% and 10% in 
euro equivalent terms of the initial US dollar 
and Japanese yen portfolio. This remained so 
until 2003, except during the market intervention 
in 2000 when ﬁ   rst Japanese yen were sold 
and later rebalanced against US dollar. 
In 2003, a rebalancing of the foreign currency 
reserves was decided by the Governing 
Council, which was implemented from the 
ﬁ   rst half of 2004. Gradually the shares were 
brought to respectively 80% and 20% by the 
beginning of 2008, and stood at 78% and 22% 
at the end of 2009 as a result of the weakening 
of the dollar against the Japanese yen.
This rebalancing is deﬁ  ned based on the relative 
value of the holdings in euro (see Charts 2(c)-4(c)). 
The implementation of the rebalancing affects 
the volume of the holdings in Charts 2(a)-4(a). 
The rebalancing was a driving factor behind the 
increase in Japanese yen volume in Chart 3(a), 
partly realised by contributions from gold sales.
Chart 4 Gold holdings
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2   MAIN DRIVERS 
OF ECB BALANCE 
SHEET ITEMS
Investment gains and losses and interest income
Apart from the gold sales and rebalancing of 
currency positions, the active management of 
foreign reserves implies ongoing investment 
gains and losses that change the volume and 
composition of foreign reserves. The foreign 
reserve management is subject to the constraint 
of keeping liquid resources for any foreign 
exchange intervention at any point in time. 
As a result, liquidity and security are the main 
requirements for the investment of the reserves. 
Subject to these constraints, the reserves are 
managed so as to maximise their value.
The investment gains and losses imply small 
changes in the volume of reserves related to 
asset price revaluations which add to the effect 
of interest income earned on the securities they 
are invested in. The gradual increase in the 
dollar reserves between 2004 and 2009 as shown 
in Chart 2(a) corresponds to a typical pattern for 
consistent earnings on dollar-denominated assets. 
On one occasion in 2000, the interest income 
accrued was sold to maintain the currency split, 
but this policy was not continued afterwards, 
mainly due to the interventions later in 2000 
which resulted in major US dollar outﬂ  ows.
EXCHANGE RATE AND GOLD PRICE 
DEVELOPMENTS
Exchange rate developments had a signiﬁ  cant 
impact on the value of the foreign reserves 
in euro. Chart 2(b) shows how the euro ﬁ  rst 
depreciated against the dollar until 2001. After 
the foreign exchange intervention in late 2000, 
the euro started to appreciate. Between 2002 
and 2004, the euro appreciated strongly to reach 
EUR/USD 1.36 at end-2004 mainly related to 
a deterioration of the growth outlook for the 
United States, the widening US current account 
deﬁ  cit and geopolitical tensions. In 2005, the 
euro depreciated, but then rebounded sharply to 
reach EUR/USD 1.58 at the beginning of 2008. 
The continued appreciation of the euro was 
driven largely by a changing market assessment 
of the relative cyclical outlook for the two 
economic areas in favour of the euro area and 
developments in interest rate differentials. 
In addition, the persistently large US current 
account deﬁ   cit is likely to have contributed 
to the weakness of the US currency. The euro 
depreciated signiﬁ   cantly vis-à-vis the dollar 
during the ﬁ  nancial crisis of 2008 down to EUR/
USD 1.32 in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009, but rose 
afterwards to EUR/USD 1.43 by end-2009.
The strong movements in the EUR/JPY 
exchange rate offset each other largely over 
the 11-year period (see Chart 3(b)). First, the 
yen appreciated against the euro against a 
background of signiﬁ   cant current account 
surpluses of Japan and general weakness of 
the euro to stand at EUR/JPY 95 at the end of 
the third quarter of 2000. From 2001, the euro 
started to appreciate gradually related to the 
deteriorating economic situation in Japan. The 
appreciation of the euro halted in 2003-04 at 
about EUR/JPY 135, but continued thereafter. 
During 2006-07, “carry trade” transactions were 
seen as one of the factors that contributed to 
the strengthening of the euro against the yen at 
times to almost EUR/JPY 170. During the 2008 
ﬁ  nancial crisis, the euro depreciated sharply to 
EUR/JPY 126 at end-2008 and recovered only 
slightly in 2009. 
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Chart 4(b) shows how the gold price rose 
somewhat between 1999 and 2004 from €279 
per ounce to €322 per ounce at end-2004. 
In 2005, it increased sharply to reach €482 per 
ounce at the start of 2006. It then remained 
stable around that price until it again increased 
sharply from 2007 on to reach €765 per ounce 
at the end of 2009. The gold price beneﬁ  ted 
from the increase in inﬂ  ation  (expectations) 
and commodity prices, as well as from the 
weakening of the US dollar. It also served as 
a safe haven during the ﬁ  nancial turmoil that 
started in mid-2007.
EXCHANGE RATE AND VOLUME EFFECTS
The euro equivalents of the foreign reserve 
holdings in Charts 2(c)-4(c) are determined by 
both the volume changes in Charts 2(a)-4(a) and 
the price developments in Charts 2(b)-4(b).
The euro equivalent of the US dollar reserves 
stood at €30 billion at end-2009, which is about 
the level the ECB started with in 1999. The 
intervention in 2000 causing a negative volume 
effect, the gradual increase in the volume of 
dollars after the intervention due to earned 
interest income and the depreciation of the 
dollar observed over the same period offset each 
other. This is conﬁ   rmed by Charts 2(d)-4(d), 
where the changes in the euro equivalents are 
split into price and volume effects. At the start of 
the period, positive price effects occurred when 
the dollar appreciated, but these were followed 
by a long series of negative price effects. 
Moreover, the latter offset the smaller volume 
increases resulting from investment returns 
and the occasionally positive price effects. 
The appreciation of the dollar at end-2008 only 
partly offset the decrease in the euro equivalent. 
The euro equivalent of the Japanese yen 
holdings more than doubled from €3.4 billion to 
€8.6 billion over the 11-year period. Although 
the yen depreciated over most of the period, 
this was reversed at the end of 2008. Moreover, 
the effect of the depreciating yen was offset 
by increases in the volume of yen. Chart 3(d) 
shows how a number of positive volume 
effects dominate the negative price effects 
since 2004. These volume increases are related 
to investments of the gold sale proceeds and 
the rebalancing of the currency holdings. The 
strong price effect at end-2008 represents the 
sharp appreciation, which caused a jump in 
the euro equivalent. The sharp drop in volume 
related to the market interventions in 2000 
and the subsequent recovery of the volume via 
rebalancing against the dollar reserves can also 
be observed in the decomposition.
The euro equivalent of the gold holdings 
increased by 78% from €6.9 billion at the 
beginning of 1999 to €12.3 billion at end-2009. 
Until 2004, the gold price increased gradually 
along a volatile path, which implied a series of 
price effects with opposite signs. From 2005 on, 
strong persistent price increases occurred, which 
dominated the negative volume effects resulting 
from gold sales. This implied an increase in the 
euro equivalent of the gold holdings despite the 
gold sales.
Overall, the shares of the different assets in 
the foreign reserve portfolio changed in favour 
of gold and yen. At the end of 2008, the euro 
equivalent of US dollar holdings represented 
59% of the reserves (down from 75%), while 
Japanese yen holdings represented 16% (up from 
8%) and gold represented 24% (up from 17%). 
Chart 1 shows that the increase in the euro value 
of gold holdings offset the decrease in dollar 
reserves, especially since 2005. The sharply 
increasing gold price, which led to a rise in the 
euro equivalent of the gold holdings, thereby 
countered the depreciation of the dollar to a 
certain extent. In fact, the total foreign reserve 
holdings increased in 2005 and remained around 
that level until 2008. This also made up for the 
decrease in reserves during 2003-04. The rising 
value of the yen reserves expressed in euro, 
which is mainly explained by gold sales, also 
countered the depreciating dollar. By end-2008, 
the appreciating yen and dollar pushed the euro 
equivalent signiﬁ  cantly further above its initial 
1999 value of €40 billion to €50 billion.15
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REVALUATION ACCOUNTS 
On the ECB balance sheet, any realised gains 
or losses, for example from selling an asset, are 
booked against the proﬁ  t and loss account. Any 
unrealised gains resulting from an increase in the 
market value of ﬁ  nancial assets are recorded as a 
separate revaluation item. Any unrealised losses 
that exceed any previous revaluation gains are 
booked against the proﬁ  t and loss account. This 
set-up is a result of the “prudence” accounting 
principle adopted by the ESCB that requires that 
the income recognition is carried out prudently 
as described above.
In order to calculate the revaluation or unrealised 
gain, the market value of the holdings is 
compared with their “average cost”. The average 
cost keeps track of the average acquisition price 
of the asset. In general, when an asset is bought, 
the average cost of the asset holdings adjusts to 
the transaction price in proportion to the weight 
of the acquisition in the total holdings of the 
asset. When the asset is sold, the average cost 
does not change. The average cost is updated to 
the market price used for revaluation purposes 
only if the market price results in an unrealised 
loss at the end of a year. 
On the ECB balance sheet, revaluation gains are 
booked separately as an item on the liabilities 
side. The revaluation amount is a total of the 
unrealised gains per asset, i.e. unrealised gains 
are not netted against unrealised losses of 
other assets. 
A number of observations can be made which 
also follow from the revaluation account 
rules and exchange rate developments. The 
revaluations due to exchange rate movements 
have been most signiﬁ  cant, i.e. more so than 
asset price revaluations. The prudent approach 
has proved appropriate for the US dollar 
holdings during the 11-year period, because 
the unrealised gains during 1999-2002 and 
2005-2006, when the dollar appreciated, turned 
out to be temporary. Treating these unrealised 
gains as proﬁ   t would have resulted in more 
signiﬁ  cant losses being taken to the proﬁ  t and 
loss account in periods in which foreign reserve 
currencies depreciated. In relation to gold, a 
signiﬁ  cant revaluation gain has accumulated, 
especially since 2005. These unrealised gains 
mainly reﬂ  ect the strong market price increase 
and the fact that no unrealised losses occurred 
at the year-end. The revaluation of the Japanese 
yen holdings was relatively unimportant. 
This is partly due to the frequent inﬂ  ows 
into Japanese yen reserves, implying that the 
average cost adjusted as often and tracked 
the market price relatively closely. Moreover, 
a number of year-end unrealised losses for 
the Japanese yen holdings also contributed 
to this via the corresponding updates of the 
average cost. At the end of 2008, however, 
the revaluation account increased signiﬁ  cantly 
when the Japanese yen appreciated sharply.
2.1.2 OWN FUNDS PORTFOLIO
The ECB’s own funds portfolio reﬂ  ects  the 
investment of its paid-up capital, the counterpart 
of the provision against foreign exchange, 
interest rate and gold price risks, the general 
reserve fund and income accumulated on 
the portfolio in the past. The objective of its 
management is to outperform its strategic 
benchmark over the medium term. The own 
funds strategic benchmark reﬂ  ects the return-risk 
preferences of the ECB and aims to maximise 
the expected return of the portfolio subject 
to the objective of outperforming a historical 
average of the ECB’s main policy rate (usually 
the interest rate applied to the ECB’s main 
reﬁ  nancing operations) at a certain conﬁ  dence 
level and over a certain horizon. The portfolio is 
invested in euro-denominated assets and booked 
under the heading “other ﬁ  nancial assets” on the 
ECB balance sheet. The own funds portfolio 
provides the ECB with (interest) income, which 
helps to cover its operating expenses.
Investment gains and capital have contributed 
to the size of the own funds, but the portfolio 
has especially grown due to inﬂ  ows from the 
investment of the provision. At the year-end, 
surpluses have often been kept as provisions 
and reserves, which were subsequently 16
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invested in the own funds portfolio. The 
own funds amounted to €3.5 billion in 1999. 
In 2000, the intervention to support the euro 
exchange rate implied signiﬁ  cant gains from 
selling US dollars and Japanese yen, which 
were used to establish a risk provision. The 
provision was partially invested in the own 
funds portfolio in 2001. ECB proﬁ  ts in 2001 
and 2002 were partly taken to the general 
reserve fund of the ECB and subsequently 
invested as part of the own funds portfolio 
(the next year). Losses due to the depreciation 
of the US dollar and Japanese yen absorbed 
the entire risk provision and general reserve 
in 2003 and 2004. In 2005, it was decided to 
set up a new risk provision. During 2005-08, 
proﬁ  ts were taken to the new risk provision 
and transferred to the own funds portfolio for 
investment the next year. At end-2009, the 
own funds portfolio stood at €11.8 billion. 
2.2 LIQUIDITY-PROVIDING  OPERATIONS 
IN FOREIGN CURRENCY DURING 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
From mid-2007 onwards, the Eurosystem and 
other central banks were faced with much higher 
liquidity needs from the banking sector due to the 
disruption of the euro and other money markets. 
The Eurosystem supplied the necessary liquidity 
in order to steer the short-term interest rate to 
its target. At the same time, the Eurosystem 
took its responsibility as a lender of last resort, 
and its task to maintain ﬁ  nancial stability also 
motivated bigger and additional operations.
The monetary policy implementation of 
the Eurosystem is coordinated by the ECB, 
but carried out by the NCBs. The ECB did, 
however, take part in additional operations 
that aimed to provide foreign currency to 
Eurosystem counterparties. These operations 
started at end-2007 and became a third factor 
that signiﬁ  cantly affected the size of the ECB 
balance sheet. First, the liquidity-providing 
operations involving the ECB are described 
and then their effect on the balance sheet is 
presented.
2.2.1 LIQUIDITY OPERATIONS IN FOREIGN 
CURRENCY AND PROVISION OF EURO 
TO OTHER CENTRAL BANKS
On 12 December 2007, the ECB together with 
a number of other central banks announced 
new measures designed to address the elevated 
pressures in short-term (US dollar) funding 
markets. The Governing Council of the ECB 
decided to take joint action with the Federal 
Reserve by offering US dollar funding to 
Eurosystem counterparties. 
Between December 2007 and January 2010, 
the Eurosystem conducted US dollar liquidity-
providing operations, in connection with the 
US dollar Term Auction Facility (TAF), against 
ECB-eligible collateral, i.e. euro-denominated 
assets. US dollars were provided by the Federal 
Reserve to the ECB by means of a temporary 
reciprocal currency arrangement (swap 
line). The dollars were then passed on to the 
NCBs which provided them to Eurosystem 
counterparties in accordance with the results 
of the ECB tender operation. The interest rates 
applied to the transactions between the Federal 
Reserve and the ECB and between the ECB and 
the NCBs were those which the Federal Reserve 
set for its corresponding transactions with its 
US counterparties. The size of the reciprocal 
currency arrangements with the Federal 
Reserve was adjusted on several occasions to 
accommodate increases in the needs. The initial 
operations were not rolled over and were left 
to expire in February 2008. In March 2008, 
after tensions increased in the run-up to the 
rescue of US investment bank Bear Stearns, 
the operations were relaunched. By the end 
of 2008, tensions in the ﬁ  nancial markets had 
grown further due to the uncertainty created by 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The initial 
maximum amount of USD 20 billion (spread 
over two overlapping operations) was gradually 
increased to USD 70 billion under the TAF 
agreement by the end of the third quarter 
of 2008. The initial maturity of 28 days was 
also extended to 84 days for a large part of the 
amount. Additional measures were taken in 
the form of overnight operations for amounts 17
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up to USD 30 billion and one-week operations 
of USD 35 billion. From 16 October 2008 on, 
ﬁ   xed interest rate tenders with full allotment 
were carried out with 7, 28 or 84-day maturity. 
From then on, the overnight operations would 
only take place if deemed necessary. 
From 23 October 2008 on, the Eurosystem also 
carried out foreign exchange swap tenders (apart 
from reverse operations) with its counterparties 
against euro cash, at a ﬁ  xed price expressed in 
swap points, with full allotment. The EUR/USD 
foreign exchange swaps were discontinued at 
the end of January 2009 due to limited demand.
Euro area banks also had problems accessing 
Swiss franc funding. From 20 October 2008 on, 
the ECB and the Swiss National Bank (SNB) 
conducted EUR/CHF foreign exchange swaps 
with their respective counterparties, providing 
CHF to counterparties against EUR. From 
5 November 2008, 84-day swap operations were 
carried out. After 16 January 2009, one-week 
EUR/CHF foreign exchange swaps continued 
providing Swiss francs against euro to improve 
liquidity in the short-term Swiss franc money 
market. Furthermore, the SNB held an account 
with the ECB for the placement of EUR funds 
received by the SNB from similar types of 
operations with other central banks and from its 
counterparties.
Furthermore, banks outside the euro area 
had problems accessing euro liquidity. On 
16 October 2008, it was announced that the 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) and the ECB 
would set up repurchase transactions, which 
provided the MNB with a facility to borrow up 
to €5 billion. On 27 October 2008, a currency 
arrangement between Danmarks Nationalbank 
and the ECB was announced. The operations 
would consist of EUR/DKK swap operations up 
to an aggregate outstanding value of a maximum 
of €12 billion at any given time. Danmarks 
Nationalbank offered the euro funding to 
its counterparties. On 6 November 2008, an 
agreement between Narodowy Bank Polski 
(NBP) and the ECB to provide euro liquidity was 
concluded and provided the NBP with a facility 
to borrow up to €10 billion. On 10 June 2009, 
it was announced that the ECB had activated the 
swap line with Sveriges Riksbank which had 
already been agreed in late 2007. The Riksbank 
could borrow up to €10 billion for a maturity up 
to three months.
2.2.2 IMPACT ON THE BALANCE SHEET
Chart 6 presents the size of the liquidity 
operations that the ECB undertook with non-euro 
area central banks. It shows how the total of the 
operations with the Federal Reserve accelerated 
and totalled on average €217 billion between 
mid-October 2008 and mid-January 2009. The 
operations with other central banks were smaller 
and totalled on average €34 billion between 
mid-November 2008 and mid-January 2009. 
The total amount of the operations grew strongly 
at the end of 2008, but gradually faded out 
during 2009. The US dollar repo operations 
moderated over time, while the much smaller 
US dollar swap operations ended in April 2009. 
The size of the positions with the SNB remained 
almost constant and the size of the positions 
with the other central banks remained small. 
In January 2010, the ECB in agreement with 
the Swiss National Bank decided to discontinue 
the Swiss franc liquidity-providing operations. 
In coordination with other central banks, 
the temporary swap lines with the Federal 
Reserve were also discontinued following the 
improvements observed in the functioning of 
ﬁ  nancial markets.
No operations with the NBP took place and 
hence this facility was not used.
Chart 7 shows the size of the ECB asset (+) and 
liability (-) items on a quarterly basis and clearly 
shows the expansion of the balance sheet due to 
the special operations. The balance sheet more 
than tripled in size between the second quarter 
of 2007 and the fourth quarter of 2008, before 
it decreased gradually in 2009 as the special 
operations matured. The intra-Eurosystem 
claims and liabilities denominated in euro also 
increased.18
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Although the ECB only acted as an intermediary 
between the non-euro area central banks and 
the NCBs, the transactions, in line with the 
ESCB accounting rules, did not net out, and 
resulted in an increase of the size of its balance 
sheet. The increase was caused by the euro 
leg of e.g. the USD-EUR swaps. In particular, 
the settlement of the EUR leg of the transactions 
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conducted with the NCBs led to an increase 
of ECB “intra-Eurosystem claims” of on 
average €217 billion in late 2008. In addition, 
the corresponding swap transactions with the 
Federal Reserve resulted in a large increase 
in “liabilities to non-euro area residents 
denominated in euro” (it should be noted that the 
euro part of the swaps with the Federal Reserve 
did not settle but rather created a liability).
The other smaller operations increased 
a number of balance sheet items somewhat. 
The settlement of the Danish krone or 
Swedish krona leg of the swap transactions 
with respectively Danmarks Nationalbank 
or Sveriges Riksbank increased the “claims 
on non-euro area residents denominated in 
foreign currency”. The swap transaction 
between the ECB and NCBs to provide Swiss 
francs resulted in “intra-Eurosystem balances”. 
The liability of the ECB to the Swiss National 
Bank increased the “liabilities to non-euro area 
residents denominated in euro”. In addition, the 
latter item contains the euro deposits placed by 
the Swiss National Bank at the ECB. “Claims 
on non-euro area residents denominated in 
euro” contained the claim on the Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank in connection with repurchase 
transactions. The ﬁ  nancial  implications 
of these operations are discussed in Section 3.
2.3  ECB BANKNOTE ISSUANCE
The ECB’s balance sheet increased gradually 
due to the strong demand for euro banknotes. 
According to Article 106 of the EU Treaty, the 
ECB has the exclusive right to authorise the 
issuance of euro banknotes. In practice, the euro 
banknotes are put into circulation by the NCBs 
and the ECB has been assigned a share of 8% 
of the total banknotes in circulation as presented 
in Chart 8. Until end-2001, only national 
banknotes were in circulation and these were 
recorded on the balance sheets of the individual 
NCBs. Since 2002, euro banknotes are 
in circulation and the ECB’s share appeared on 
its balance sheet. This share implies a claim by 
the ECB on the NCBs, as the ECB itself does 
not put banknotes into circulation. 
The demand for euro banknotes proved to be 
consistently strong. As a result, the ECB intra-
Eurosystem claim related to the banknote 
issuance grew gradually over time from 
€10,638 million at the beginning of 2002 to 
€64,513 million at the end of 2009. Together 
with banknotes in circulation (i.e. the mirror 
item on the liabilities side), it made the total 
balance sheet grow gradually. The gradual 
increase can be observed for the period 2002-07 
in Chart 7, but was overshadowed by the special 
operations after 2007.
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3  MAIN DRIVERS OF ECB PROFIT AND LOSS
During the ﬁ   rst 11 years, the variability of 
the ECB ﬁ  nancial result was naturally related 
to the main drivers of the balance sheet 
items discussed in Section 2. The way these 
drivers affected the ECB proﬁ  t and loss account 
is discussed. In particular, this section presents 
the main income and expense drivers and 
points out which items they affect on the ECB 
proﬁ  t and loss account. Furthermore, the ECB’s 
ﬁ  nancial buffers are presented and the way these 
were used to smooth surpluses and cover losses 
is explained.
Three main income and expense drivers are 
identiﬁ  ed. First, banknote demand and nominal 
interest rates, which give rise to income from 
the issuance of euro banknotes (i.e. seigniorage), 
were important components of ECB income. 
Second, ﬁ  nancial market developments had an 
important impact on the ﬁ  nancial result, mainly 
due to the exposure of foreign reserve holdings. 
Third, the ﬁ  nancial crisis at the end of the period 
is identiﬁ  ed as a potentially important driver, 
although its impact was limited up to 2009. 
3.1  MAIN INCOME AND EXPENSE DRIVERS
The ECB’s regular income is derived primarily 
from investment earnings on its holdings 
of foreign reserve assets and from interest 
income on its 8% share of the euro banknotes 
in circulation. Furthermore, the exposure of 
the foreign reserve holdings to exchange rate, 
asset price and interest rate risks implies that its 
ﬁ   nancial result is signiﬁ   cantly determined by 
revaluations. The importance of these factors 
can be derived from the proﬁ  t and loss account 
overview in the Appendix, where these items 
are separately reﬂ  ected. Here, the income and 
expense drivers are discussed in more detail.
3.1.1 SEIGNIORAGE AS A FUNCTION OF BANKNOTE 
DEMAND AND THE MONETARY POLICY 
STANCE
As inﬂ  ation moderated in developed economies 
in the last decade, the average seigniorage 
income has decreased for many central banks 
over time, but remains a reliable income source 
in the long run, and helps central banks to 
maintain their ﬁ  nancial independence. 
The monetary income of the Eurosystem 
mainly consists of interest income arising from 
the liquidity-providing operations due to the 
reﬁ  nancing needs of the banking system. Those 
reﬁ   nancing needs primarily stem from the 
issuance of euro banknotes whose volume is a 
function of euro banknote demand. The income 
earned by Eurosystem central banks is linked 
to the interest rate applied on liquidity-
providing operations, which is usually close 
to the marginal rate of the main reﬁ  nancing 
operations (MROs), slightly higher than the 
main policy rate of the ECB. The amount of 
liquidity supplied by the Eurosystem is based on 
an estimate of the demand such that the short-
term money market interest rate remains close 
to the policy rate, i.e. the minimum bid rate of 
the main reﬁ  nancing operations. The monetary 
income consists of this interest income minus 
certain expenditures. The main expenditure 
is the interest paid on the amount of required 
reserves the monetary ﬁ  nancial institutions hold 
with the Eurosystem. This interest rate paid is 
the average MRO rate such that on average the 
required reserves do not provide income to the 
Eurosystem. Any excess reserves kept with the 
Eurosystem are not remunerated and therefore 
proﬁ  table to the Eurosystem, but are typically 
small (<0.5%, for that same reason, because 
it is costly to commercial banks). The central 
banks only incur a small cost for printing 
banknotes, hence the so-called seigniorage 
income represents most of the Eurosystem’s 
monetary income. 
The ECB receives interest on its 8% share of 
the total euro banknote issuance. As the ECB 
does not put the euro banknotes into circulation, 
it holds a claim on the NCBs of the Eurosystem 
which fulﬁ  l that task. Interest on the claims of the 
ECB in respect of its share of banknotes is earned 
at the latest marginal rate (or ﬁ  xed rate) for the 
Eurosystem’s main reﬁ  nancing operations. 21
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The seigniorage has been boosted by strong 
banknote demand since the changeover 
in 2002. Chart 9 shows the increase in total 
banknotes in circulation, which implied 
that the ECB banknote share tripled from 
€20 billion at end-2002 to over €60 billion by 
end-2009. For a given marginal MRO rate, 
the growth in banknotes raised the potential 
income from seigniorage. 
The often projected decrease in banknote 
demand due to the use of electronic payments 
(e-money) has not materialised and is not likely 
to pose a major threat. For example, Goodhart 
(2000) provided a number of arguments why 
currency will not disappear so easily and these 
arguments have been vindicated. Chart 9 shows 
the strong trend in the amount of euro banknotes 
in circulation, but also the ratio of banknotes 
to GDP (not depicted) increased strongly over 
time, indicating an increase in currency use. 
The marginal MRO rate is also a crucial factor 
of ECB seigniorage, which introduces more 
variation in seigniorage. This can be observed 
by comparing the charts in Chart 9. The rate 
varied considerably over the period and made 
seigniorage strongly correlated with the 
marginal MRO rate. The decreasing marginal 
MRO rate at the start of the period implied that 
the seigniorage stagnated in the period 2002-03, 
despite the increase in banknotes. Similarly, the 
rate and seigniorage strongly increased from 
2005 onwards and dropped at end-2008.
In this analysis, the marginal MRO rate is taken 
as given when it comes to ECB income, and 
hence seigniorage is endogenous. The steering 
of the policy rate (and MRO rate) only serves 
the ECB’s primary objective of price stability, 
and proﬁ  t maximisation does not play any role.
3.1.2 FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 
AND RESERVE MANAGEMENT
The substantial foreign reserve and own funds 
portfolios of the ECB result in gains and losses 
through portfolio management operations and 
developments in asset prices, exchange rates 
and interest rates. Central bank foreign reserves 
are typically not hedged. As a consequence, 
revaluations through price and exchange rate 
movements have an important impact on the 
ﬁ  nancial position. Moreover, this implies that 
the asset side of the balance sheet does not 
necessarily match the liabilities in terms of 
return. The reserve management is also subject 
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to liquidity and security conditions, which 
limit the return potential. Below, the impact 
of  ﬁ  nancial market developments and reserve 
management is discussed, while making a 
distinction between realised gains/losses from 
trading securities, write-downs resulting from 
revaluations and interest income developments.
REALISED GAINS AND LOSSES 
The realised gains/losses were dominated by 
gains from the foreign exchange intervention 
to support the euro exchange rate in 2000-01 
and gold sales during 2005-09. Realised losses 
remained limited and were dominated by realised 
gains, but this is partly due to the Eurosystem’s 
accounting rules. Chart 10 presents the realised 
gains and losses per year.
The biggest realised annual gain from US dollar 
holdings, amounting to €2,496 million, resulted 
from the sales as part of the intervention, 
while interest rate developments led to a 
series of smaller gains in the following years. 
The downward trend in US interest rates during 
2001-03 supported security (bond) prices 
allowing realised gains from sales of US dollar 
assets, although the depreciation of the dollar 
in 2002-04 exerted downward pressure on the 
gains. Similarly, the drop in US interest rates 
during 2007-09 corresponded to realised gains. 
The US dollar exchange rate against the euro 
was volatile over this period, but its overall 
depreciation suppressed the realised gains to 
a certain extent. Conversely, the increasing 
US interest rates during 2005-06 led to small 
realised losses. 
In comparison, the realised gains and losses on 
the yen and euro portfolios have been modest, 
but gold sales implied signiﬁ  cant gains in the 
second half of the period. In fact, the realised 
gains and losses have been tiny for yen 
investments over the 11-year period, except 
for the large gain of €867 million from the yen 
portfolio’s part in the exchange rate intervention 
in 2000. The realised gains and losses on the 
euro portfolio followed the pattern in euro 
area interest rates, with gains in 2001-05 and 
losses in 2006-07. The gains and losses on the 
euro portfolio were also small compared with 
those on the US dollar holdings. A signiﬁ  cant 
contribution to income, however, came from the 
gold sales that took place during 2005-09 as part 
of the Central Bank Gold Agreement. 
Chart 10 Realised gains and losses and write-downs at year-end
(EUR millions) (EUR millions)
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The dominance of gains partly results from 
Eurosystem accounting rules and realised 
gains/losses only reveal part of the portfolio 
performance. Realised gains depend on the 
revaluation of an asset at the time of its sale 
(see the discussion on revaluation accounts in 
Sub-section 2.1.1). These unrealised gains can 
accumulate in revaluation accounts over time 
and hence can lead to substantial realised gains. 
By contrast, unrealised losses are expensed at 
the year-end and therefore do not accumulate 
further and will be smaller on average when 
realised. Unrealised losses hence also need to 
be taken into account to have an idea about the 
exposure and performance of the portfolio.
WRITE-DOWNS DUE TO ASSET PRICE 
AND EXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS
Unrealised losses were mainly related to the 
depreciation of the dollar, and to a smaller extent 
the yen. According to the Eurosystem accounting 
rules, an unrealised loss at the year-end 
results in a write-down on the corresponding 
asset. Chart 10 presents the unrealised losses at 
year-end throughout the 11-year period. It can 
be seen that the largest write-downs were on the 
US dollar holdings during the periods of dollar 
depreciation in 2003-04 and 2007. The gradual 
depreciation of the yen added to that in several 
years, in particular in 2006. As becomes clear 
below, especially the write-downs in 2003-04 
weighed on the ECB ﬁ  nancial  result. 
In comparison to the exchange rate effects, the 
impact of asset price movements was relatively 
unimportant.
INTEREST INCOME FROM FOREIGN RESERVES 
AND THE OWN FUNDS PORTFOLIO 
The overall net interest income from currency 
holdings was mainly driven by US interest rate 
developments. The net interest income of a 
currency holding in euro depends on the size of 
the position, its interest rate and the exchange 
rate. The dominance of the US interest income 
compared with other currencies, shown in 
Chart 11, is also explained by these components. 
First, the net interest income on US dollar 
holdings was relatively large because of the 
size of these holdings. Second, US interest rates 
were usually higher than those in the euro area 
and Japan. Third, the depreciation of the dollar 
decreased the income somewhat, but did not 
offset the size and interest rate effects.
The net interest income from euro holdings 
reﬂ   ects the interest income from the own 
funds portfolio. Together with realised gains, 
the return on the own funds portfolio helps to 
cover the operational expenses of the ECB 
(administrative expenses, staff costs, etc.), but 
did not fully cover them every year.
INTEREST PAID ON THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
TRANSFER AND THE INTEREST RATE GAP
The ECB earns interest on its foreign reserve 
investments (of US dollars and Japanese yen), 
but also remunerates the euro-denominated claim 
due to the initial transfer of foreign reserves by 
the NCBs to the ECB. In particular, pursuant to 
Article 30.3 of the Statute of the ESCB and of 
the ECB, the Governing Council decided that 
the NCB claims should be denominated in euro 
using the valuations at the time of the transfer 
(hence ﬁ  xed), and should be remunerated on a 
daily basis at the latest available marginal MRO 
rate, adjusted to take account of the zero rate 
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of return on the gold component. In practice, 
this means that the amount of the original 
transfers is ﬁ  xed in euro terms and remunerated 
at 85% of the latest marginal MRO rate, since 
gold represented 15% of the total transfer and 
earns no remuneration (i.e. it is not invested in 
interest-bearing instruments). In other words, 
the development of the MRO rate determines 
the path of the interest expense for the transfer 
of foreign reserves. 
The ECB is exposed to the gap between the 
interest earned on the foreign reserve assets and 
the interest paid on the euro-denominated claim 
due to the initial transfer of foreign reserves. Chart 
12 presents the related charts. There is a mismatch 
between both as the income depends mainly on 
US interest rates, while the expense depends 
on the MRO rate. The interest rate gap implies 
a discrepancy between the interest income and 
expense. Chart 12 presents the policy rates in the 
United States and euro area as a proxy for interest 
rate dynamics in these areas. The correlation 
of interest income and expense, respectively, 
with these rates is clear (despite the maturity 
mismatch). Furthermore, as the euro area rates 
and US rates were signiﬁ  cantly correlated over 
time, the interest income and interest expense on 
foreign reserves have been close and the income 
gap has been small in most years.
3.1.3 IMPACT OF THE 2007-09 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
ON ECB FINANCIAL RETURNS
The crisis which started in 2007 has had a 
negative ﬁ  nancial impact on the ECB, but it also 
triggered favourable revaluations up to 2009 
that act as a buffer outside the proﬁ  t and loss 
account. The ﬁ  nancial crisis affected the ECB’s 
ﬁ  nancial result through three channels: interest 
rates,  ﬁ   nancial market volatility and special 
operations. 
First, a lower policy rate implies lower 
seigniorage. If the crisis affects the real economy 
and upside risks to price stability subside, then a 
relaxation of the monetary policy stance implies 
a lower policy rate and hence lower seigniorage 
income. Chart 9 shows a drop in seigniorage at 
the end of 2008, which persisted in 2009. If the 
policy rate approaches zero, then the marginal 
MRO rate is close to zero and the seigniorage 
income evaporates, leaving the ECB with an 
insufﬁ  cient source of regular income. As the key 
MRO rate remained at 1% in 2009, the latter has 
not materialised.
Lower remuneration paid on the foreign reserve 
transfer may be partly offset by lower income 
from foreign reserve investments, thus does not 
play an important role. On the one hand, as the 
remuneration of the foreign reserve transfer 
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depends on the marginal MRO rate, it will be 
lower. On the other hand, lower foreign nominal 
interest rates are likely to depress the interest 
income. A decrease in nominal interest rates on 
foreign-denominated instruments leads to one-off 
unrealised mark-to-market gains, at the price of 
future low or negative returns. In the Japanese 
case, investment returns have remained depressed 
for years, whereas in the US case, the phase of 
low yields was in 2002-03 following the bursting 
of the “dotcom” bubble and again in 2009. 
Second, the exchange rate and asset price 
developments brought (un)realised gains to 
the ECB. Although increased ﬁ  nancial market 
volatility implies higher investment risk, the 
price of government bonds moved up due to 
safe-haven ﬂ  ows. The Japanese yen exchange 
rate against the euro appreciated strongly during 
the crisis, which is attributed to the unwinding 
of carry trades. The US dollar exchange rate 
against the euro also appreciated signiﬁ  cantly in 
the second half of 2008, but depreciated again 
somewhat in 2009. The gold price rose further, 
likely explained by a ﬂ   ight to safety, while 
decreasing nominal interest rates supported 
bond prices. These developments imply 
realised gains in the event that assets are sold 
or otherwise unrealised gains that are booked on 
the balance sheet.
Third, one can expect that special liquidity 
operations increase the risk, in theory, but they 
hardly did so for the ECB during this crisis. 
The extra liquidity operations which were set up 
during the ﬁ  nancial turmoil increase the risk to 
the Eurosystem NCBs, but much less so to the 
ECB. As discussed in Sub-section 2.2, the ECB 
acted as an intermediary between non-euro area 
central banks and the NCBs in the operations 
to provide foreign liquidity to Eurosystem 
counterparties. Admittedly, the operations 
increased the size of the ECB balance sheet and 
could in theory imply additional risk through 
the scale of the operations. However, this can be 
considered as minimal in the case of the ECB, 
as its counterparties for those operations were 
central banks across the ESCB, the SNB and the 
Federal Reserve. But the Eurosystem is subject 
to credit risk in its monetary policy operations 
and this risk materialised in late 2008 when 
ﬁ   ve counterparties defaulted on reﬁ  nancing 
operations. The Governing Council decided 
that the NCBs should establish their respective 
shares of a provision as a buffer against risks 
arising from collateral provided by these 
defaulting counterparties.
The special liquidity operations involving 
the ECB had little impact on its income and 
expenses. The cost in terms of forward points 
charged for the provision of dollar liquidity via 
swap operations with the Federal Reserve was 
paid by the counterparties and passed on via the 
NCBs to the ECB and so to the Federal Reserve. 
For the rest, the different legs of this type of 
operation were not remunerated and left the ECB 
position unaffected. In particular, the claim that 
the ECB held on the NCBs during the operation, 
i.e. the TARGET2 balance related to these 
operations, was not remunerated. Normally, 
the ECB is remunerated at the MRO rate on its 
intra-Eurosystem net claim. However, in the 
case of the Swiss franc operations, the different 
legs of an operation were remunerated, but the 
operations were constructed in such a way as to 
not materially affect the result of the ECB.
In June 2009, the Governing Council announced 
a purchase programme for covered bonds 
whereby the ECB and the NCBs, for monetary 
policy purposes, started to buy euro-denominated 
covered bonds issued in the euro area. The share 
of the ECB in the targeted amount of €60 billion 
was ﬁ  xed at 8%. The purchases are expected to 
be fully implemented by the end of June 2010. 
The programme implies credit risk to the ECB, 
but the higher yields also provide an additional 
return. As a result, the initial purchases provided 
interest income that supported the 2009 result 
somewhat. 
Overall, an assessment of the potential impact 
on the different proﬁ  t and loss account items 
indicates that a negative impact of the crisis 
on proﬁ   t can be expected. The decrease in 26
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seigniorage, which showed a close link with 
total net interest income in previous years, is 
especially important. The interest income on 
foreign reserve assets and the remuneration of 
NCBs’ claims in respect of foreign reserves 
transferred partly offset each other and are less 
relevant. The items “other interest income” 
and “other interest expense” on the proﬁ  t and 
loss account are also less relevant, despite 
their expansion during the crisis (see the P&L 
account in the Appendix), because they are 
mainly related to TARGET2 balances and offset 
each other. Furthermore, any revaluation gains 
that the turmoil brings will act as buffers in the 
future, but as they are not taken as income to 
the proﬁ  t and loss account, they will not support 
that result at this point in time. However, any 
realised gains from sales and the avoidance of 
write-downs would to a certain extent support 
the  ﬁ   nancial result. These different effects 
can be observed in the 2009 P&L account in 
comparison to previous years.
3.2 FINANCIAL  BUFFERS 
In order to support its ﬁ  nancial independence, 
the ECB has a number of ﬁ  nancial buffers in 
place: a general reserve fund, a risk provision 
and revaluation accounts. Below, these different 
buffers are ﬁ   rst described after which their 
implementation is discussed.
3.2.1 REVALUATION ACCOUNTS
The revaluation accounts act as a ﬁ  rst buffer 
against losses on the foreign reserve holdings. 
A revaluation account captures the increase in 
value of an asset that is merely due to exchange 
rate and price developments. The Eurosystem 
accounting rules prevent such an unrealised 
gain from being taken as income and possibly 
distributed to the shareholders, with the 
reasoning that such a revaluation gain may only 
be temporary. This prudent approach caps the 
current income for unrealised gains, but more 
importantly prevents ﬁ  nancial  consequences 
that would occur if the revaluation gains were 
credited to the proﬁ  t and loss account but turned 
out to be temporary. In practice, the revaluation 
accounts “absorb” at least part of the reduction 
of the value of the respective asset before any 
losses are recognised in the proﬁ   t and loss 
account. The rules also stipulate, however, that 
unrealised losses in any one security or currency 
or in gold are not netted against unrealised 
gains in other securities or currencies or gold. 
This implies that unrealised gains and losses can 
coexist on different assets. Sub-section 2.1.1 
discussed the revaluation account developments 
and how the revaluation accounts have proved 
their usefulness, in particular for the US dollar 
portfolio.
3.2.2 RESERVE AND RISK PROVISION
The ECB makes use of a general reserve fund and 
a risk provision, which both enable the bank to 
cover occasional losses with previous surpluses, 
but in a different manner. From the start, the 
general reserve fund was in place. In 2000, a risk 
provision against exchange rate, interest rate and 
gold price risks was set up, which after depletion 
was re-established in 2005.
Firstly, pursuant to Article 33.1 of the Statute 
of the ESCB and of the ECB, up to 20% of 
the proﬁ  t in any year may be transferred to the 
general reserve fund, subject to a limit equal 
to 100% of the ECB’s capital. The remaining 
net proﬁ  t is to be distributed to the NCBs, as 
shareholders of the ECB, in proportion to their 
shares in the paid-up capital. Losses may be 
offset against the general reserve, and upon a 
decision of the Governing Council, against the 
monetary income of the relevant ﬁ  nancial year 
(see Article 33.2 of the Statute). The transfers to 
and from the reserve take place after the ﬁ  nancial 
year is closed, i.e. after the annual proﬁ  t or loss 
has been determined, and are hence outside the 
proﬁ  t and loss account.
Secondly, as mentioned above, a risk 
provision was established in order to provide 
an additional buffer against the exchange rate, 
interest rate and gold price risks of the ECB. 
The provision can be used to cover realised and 
unrealised losses at the end of the year, which 
may not be adequately covered by revaluation 
accounts. The advantage compared with 
the general reserve is that it can be built up 27
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faster. As Chart 13 shows, the risk provision 
was ﬁ  rst set up in 2000, depleted in 2003-04, 
and re-established from 2005. The size of 
the risk provision and the general reserve 
fund together may not exceed the value 
of the paid-up capital of the Eurosystem 
NCBs, which stood at €4,020 million at 
end-2009. Subject to this upper limit, the size 
of the provision and continuing requirement 
is reviewed annually, taking a range of 
factors into account, including in particular 
the amount of risk-bearing assets, the extent 
of materialised risk exposures in the current 
ﬁ   nancial year, projected results for the 
coming year and a risk assessment involving 
calculations of Values at Risk (VaR) on 
risk-bearing assets. In 2010, the Governing 
Council decided, following the establishment 
of the covered bond purchase programme, 
to extend, as a matter of prudence, the scope 
of the provision to also cover credit risk.
The transfers to and from the provision are part 
of the proﬁ  t and loss account and thus affect the 
annual proﬁ   t or loss. Surpluses transferred to 
the provision reduce the proﬁ  t, while transfers 
from the provision can cover a negative result. 
Any remaining proﬁ  t is to be distributed to the 
NCBs, as shareholders of the ECB, in proportion 
to their paid-up capital share. Any remaining 
loss can be offset against the general reserve 
(which is then booked the subsequent year) or the 
Eurosystem monetary income of the same year.
The Governing Council decided to cover the 1999 
and 2004 losses with part of the monetary income 
of the NCBs, as foreseen in Article 33.2 of the 
Statute. The monetary income is not intended as a 
buffer for the ECB, but is meant to be distributed 
among the NCBs. Only if all else fails to protect 
the ECB paid-up capital can it be used. In 1999, 
no provisions or revaluation accounts were in 
place to protect the paid-up capital. A direct 
charge on the monetary income of the NCBs 
resulted. In 2004, when both the special provision 
and the general reserve fund were depleted, the 
same decision was taken. In 2005, the special 
provision was replenished in order to prevent 
charges on the monetary income.
3.2.3 PAID-UP CAPITAL 
At the start of Stage Three of Monetary Union, 
the ECB was assigned a subscribed capital of 
€5 billion. The contribution of each member 
of the ESCB is determined by the capital key, 
which is the weight of each ESCB member 
country in total EU GDP (50%) and population 
(50%). The accession of a country to the EU, 
and its NCB to the ESCB, increases the 
subscribed capital of the ECB (see Article 49 
of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB). 
As long as an EU Member State does not adopt 
the euro, it pays only a small percentage of its 
subscription, and when it joins the euro area it 
pays up the remaining part. Initially, this was 
5%, but this was changed to 7% in May 2004. 
Therefore, a smaller amount of €4,000 million 
was paid up at the start, with the total increasing 
slightly to €4,142 million by 2009.
If the revaluation accounts, the risk provision 
and the general reserve fund are not sufﬁ  cient 
to cover a loss, then the Governing Council can 
decide to use Eurosystem monetary income – 
i.e. income of the NCBs – to cover any remaining 
ECB losses. In the unlikely event that this also 
proved to be inadequate, then in principle the 
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ECB paid-up capital would have to step in as 
the ﬁ  nal “buffer”. If the paid-up capital were to 
be depleted, a recapitalisation would be required 
to avoid operating with low or negative capital 
(see Section 4). 
3.2.4 HISTORY OF SETTING UP 
AND USING FINANCIAL BUFFERS
To sum up, a chronological overview is provided 
of the annual proﬁ  ts and losses, and how the 
ﬁ  nancial buffers were set up/used.
In 1999, the ECB incurred a loss of €247 million. 
Falling security prices were a main factor 
contributing to this loss, because they resulted 
in substantial end-of-year valuation write-
downs. The loss was mainly funded by a direct 
charge on the monetary income of NCBs, 
following a decision by the Governing Council 
to compensate for the fact that the monetary 
income mechanisms (as laid out in Article 33.2 
of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB) 
would not operate until after the changeover to 
the euro currency in 2002. 
In 2000, taking into account the ECB’s 
large exposure to exchange rate and interest 
rate risks, the Governing Council approved 
the setting-up of a risk provision against 
such risks amounting to €2,600 million. 
The provision was intended to cover future 
losses, in particular valuation losses, that may 
arise from market developments. The provision 
was ﬁ  nanced from the large surplus in 2000 
arising from the EUR/USD exchange rate 
interventions. Investment earnings and sales of 
foreign currency due to ofﬁ  cial exchange rate 
interventions had contributed to this surplus. 
After establishing the provision, a proﬁ  t  of 
€1,990 million remained. 20% of the proﬁ  t was 
transferred to the general reserve (€398 million) 
and the remaining part (€1,592 million) was 
distributed among the NCBs. 
In 2001, a net proﬁ   t of €1,822 million was 
made, of which again 20% was transferred 
to the general reserve and the rest distributed 
among the NCBs. The ECB made a proﬁ  t of 
€1,220 million in 2002, which for the ﬁ  rst time 
was supported by income on its share of the 
euro banknote issuance. The proﬁ  t was entirely 
distributed to the NCBs. 
In 2003, the ECB experienced big write-
downs on its ﬁ  nancial assets, mainly due to the 
evolution of exchange rates, which adversely 
affected the value of the US dollar-denominated 
assets. Lower domestic and foreign interest rates 
also contributed to the negative result. After 
tapping the risk provision for €2,569 million, a 
loss of €477 million remained, which was offset 
against the general reserve fund.
In 2004, the evolution of exchange rates further 
adversely affected the value of the holdings 
of assets denominated in foreign currencies. 
Furthermore, the low interest income on both 
domestic and foreign currency assets depressed 
the total income. The risk provision was already 
depleted from the year before, implying a net 
loss of €1,636 million. The Governing Council 
decided to offset the ECB’s 2004 loss against 
its entire general reserve fund (€296 million) 
and the remaining loss (€1,340 million) against 
the monetary income allocated to the national 
central banks. 
In 2005, the ECB earned a surplus of 
€992 million. The amount was set aside as a 
special provision against foreign exchange rate, 
interest rate and gold price risks, leaving a net 
proﬁ  t of exactly nil. Similarly, the ECB earned 
a surplus of €1,379 million in 2006, which 
was set aside in the risk provision, while in 
2007, the ECB earned a surplus of €286 million. 
The reduction in 2007 was mainly due to the 
appreciation of the euro against the US dollar 
and, to a lesser extent, the Japanese yen. 
The surplus was again set aside in the 
risk provision. In 2008, a larger surplus 
of €2,661 million was made, of which 
€1,339 million was transferred to the risk 
provision, which hereby reached its upper 
limit, such that €1,322 million remained as an 
annual proﬁ  t and was distributed to the NCBs. 
As Chart 13 shows, the risk provision thereby 29
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reached the upper limit for the provisions and 
reserves, equal to the paid-up capital of the 
Eurosystem NCBs. In 2009, the provision and 
reserve could not be increased further, and the 
net proﬁ  t of €2,253 million was distributed in 
full to the NCBs.
It should be noted that the upper limit on the 
provision and reserves was not reached until 
2008. There are two reasons for this. First of 
all, because an important part of the surpluses 
had been redistributed during the ﬁ  rst  years. 
The latter is partly the result of the 20% limit 
on transfers to the general reserve, which 
automatically implies that the remaining 80% 
of the surplus is to be distributed among the 
NCBs. Secondly, due to the ﬁ  nancial  market 
developments that depleted the reserves in 
2003-04, such that recovery only started from 
2005 onwards. The transfers of the full surplus 
to the risk provision observed during 2005-07 
and a ﬁ  nal part at the end of 2008 allowed a 
faster buffer accumulation than contributions to 
the general reserves.
The reduction of the reported net loss in 2003 
occurred mainly through the risk provision, 
while the general reserve fund contributed 
relatively little to covering the loss. Chart 14 
shows the annual surplus before any transfers 
from or to the risk provision and the general 
reserve fund. It also shows the reported annual 
proﬁ  t and loss, which includes transfers to and 
from the provision. This second line is much 
ﬂ  atter than the ﬁ  rst one and avoids a big loss in 
2003. Finally, it shows the remaining result to 
be distributed or covered when also the transfers 
to and from the general reserve fund are taken 
into account. The reserve made a relatively 
small contribution and only so in the ﬁ  rst half of 
the period. The provision and reserve were not 
sufﬁ  cient to cover the loss in 2004. Section 4 
discusses the relevance of such losses and the 
need to maintain such buffers as part of the 
analysis of ﬁ  nancial strength.
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4 FINANCIAL  STRENGTH
The analysis of the proﬁ   t and loss account 
in Section 3 made clear that the ECB runs a 
number of risks that can trigger losses and erode 
its  ﬁ   nancial position. This section discusses 
reasons why the ECB may want to prevent 
this from happening and assesses the ECB’s 
overall  ﬁ  nancial strength. According to Stella 
(2008),  ﬁ   nancial strength is “the extent to 
which an entity is constrained by its ﬁ  nancial 
situation in pursuing its strategic goals or 
policies. An entity is ﬁ  nancially strong when 
it is relatively unconstrained and weak when 
ﬁ   nancial constraints are binding on policy 
choices.” This section presents components of 
ECB ﬁ  nancial strength and risk factors. In doing 
so, it takes a step back from the ﬁ  nancial 
account charts and discusses the macroeconomic 
relevance of central bank ﬁ  nancial results. 
Sub-section 4.1 identiﬁ  es credibility as a reason 
for protecting central bank ﬁ  nancial  strength. 
Sub-section 4.2 presents important components 
of ECB ﬁ  nancial strength such as its legislative 
provisions,  ﬁ   nancial buffers and seigniorage. 
Sub-section 4.3 discusses risks to ﬁ  nancial 
strength, in particular risks to future seigniorage, 
from ﬁ  nancial market developments and from 
ﬁ  nancial instability.
4.1  WHY DOES THE ECB NEED FINANCIAL 
STRENGTH?
The  ﬁ   nancial position of a central bank is 
often treated as irrelevant because of the social 
nature of a central bank’s objectives, its money 
printing monopoly, its ability to operate with 
negative capital and its state ownership. First, 
as the primary objective of a central bank such 
as the ECB is price stability, and proﬁ  tability is 
completely subject to that aim, it would appear 
that its ﬁ  nancial accounts are only relevant at 
the micro level. They matter only to provide 
transparency on the stewardship of the public 
enterprise. Second, there is a belief that a 
ﬁ   nancially weak central bank can monetise 
itself out of ﬁ   nancial problems. Therefore, it 
should not care about eroding capital at any 
given moment in time. Third, there have been 
a few examples of central banks with prolonged 
negative capital positions operating effectively. 
Situations at the central banks of Chile and the 
Czech Republic are often taken as examples. 
Fourth, while it is still considered to be a 
political issue, a central bank can always be 
recapitalised by the state. 
A number of studies have pointed out, however, 
that the issue is more complex and that the 
ﬁ   nancial strength of a central bank does 
matter in relation to policy outcomes at the 
macro level through its effect on credibility 
(see e.g. Stella, 2005). As the historical evidence 
and analysis in these papers show, central bank 
ﬁ  nancial strength can determine the success or 
failure of monetary policy. The main reason is 
that the perceptions of a central bank’s ﬁ  nancial 
strength have an impact on the credibility of the 
central bank and its policy. If it is expected that 
the central bank is not capable of or willing to 
incur losses, then costly objectives and policies 
are not credible and the target cannot be achieved 
or only at a higher cost to the economy.
Financial strength helps the central bank to 
protect its independence, which is a crucial 
component of credibility. Furthermore, it allows 
a credible commitment to the price stability 
goal and credible interventions during ﬁ  nancial 
instability episodes. Each of these issues is 
brieﬂ  y discussed below.
4.1.1 INDEPENDENCE
A ﬁ  nancially strong ECB which does not rely 
on NCB transfers contributes to the Eurosystem 
ﬁ  nancial strength and helps the Eurosystem to 
maintain its independence from governments. 
The role of central bank independence in 
relation to credibility and policy outcomes has 
long been studied (see the literature starting, for 
example, with Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) and 
Sargent and Wallace (1982) on the relationship 
with the government). The relationship between 
the central bank and the government is always 
subtle when it comes to the credibility of central 
bank policy. More recently, the results of a 
regression analysis by Ize and Oulidi (2009) 31
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STRENGTH on a cross-section of central banks show that 
the relationship with the government reﬂ  ects 
the main difference between strong and weak 
central banks.
If a central bank depends on transfers from 
the government, the latter has the opportunity 
to inﬂ  uence the central bank’s policy, e.g. by 
attaching conditions to the transfers. This poses 
a threat to the overall independence of the 
central bank. According to Hawkins (2003), 
a central bank with negative or even low 
capital would see its (perceived) independence 
affected, because it increases the probability 
that recapitalisation is on its way, potentially 
accompanied by government attempts to 
inﬂ   uence decisions. Even if the transfers are 
minor, they will at least blur the situation and 
increase uncertainty, especially if at that time 
the state is in ﬁ  scal need or the central bank 
signals a need to tighten its stance. In short, a 
central bank needs to safeguard its ﬁ  nancial 
independence to sustain its political and 
economic independence. 
4.1.2 PRICE STABILITY
Empirical evidence on a wide range of central 
banks suggests that ﬁ  nancial weakness hampers 
central banks in the achievement of their 
inﬂ  ation objective. Stella (2008) provides such 
empirical evidence and Klüh and Stella (2008) 
made a ﬁ  rst attempt to estimate the relationship 
between the ﬁ  nancial strength of a central bank 
and its policy performance. The econometric 
evidence shows a negative relationship between 
indicators of central bank ﬁ  nancial strength and 
inﬂ  ation outcomes. 
The link between ﬁ  nancial strength, independence
and policy outcomes offers one explanation for 
these ﬁ  ndings, but monetisation is a more direct 
one. If a ﬁ  nancially weak central bank does not 
want to rely or cannot rely on the government, 
then it needs to resort to printing money or 
react less aggressively to inﬂ  ation to support its 
own income. As Stella (2008) argues: “it can 
be demonstrated that poorly-capitalised central 
banks are often constrained in their policy 
choices or, even when not so constrained, 
sometimes loosen policy to avoid large losses 
for reputation or political economy reasons”. 
Such a change in policy, however, conﬂ  icts with 
its price stability objective. 
As a result, a central bank cannot monetise itself 
out of ﬁ   nancial problems and achieve price 
stability at the same time. A situation where 
monetisation becomes likely would soon harm 
the bank’s credibility, alter inﬂ  ation expectations 
and lead to a deterioration in the inﬂ  ation 
outcome. The bank can resort to a number of 
measures to offset the secondary effects of 
monetisation by repressing the ﬁ  nancial system 
or sterilising its operations by issuing bonds, 
but those activities are usually considered to be 
problematic and not sustainable. 
The Eurosystem is dedicated to its price 
stability objective and its credibility such that it 
wants to rule out printing money as an option. 
A ﬁ  nancially strong position of the Eurosystem 
excludes any need to resort to printing money. 
The most direct way to achieve this is for 
each individual NCB and the ECB to remain 
ﬁ  nancially strong.
4.1.3 FINANCIAL STABILITY
Financial weakness may raise doubts about the 
feasibility and sustainability of other policies 
of the central bank. For example, doubts may 
arise about the central bank’s ability to perform 
its lender of last resort function and deal with 
the associated risks, or its ability to engage in 
subsidised lending to a troubled banking sector.
The central bank needs a degree of ﬁ  nancial 
independence through a capital buffer and 
a sustainable source of revenue, otherwise 
doubts might arise about the willingness of 
the central bank to act if the required policy 
involved costs (which cause a deterioration in 
its ﬁ  nancial position).
This issue especially concerns the NCBs, 
which are generally involved in Eurosystem 
emergency liquidity assistance operations within 
the rules which the ECB has set for this purpose 
(see e.g. ECB, 2007). 32
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4.2  ECB FINANCIAL STRENGTH
Given the need for ﬁ   nancial strength, this 
sub-section takes a look at the ECB’s ﬁ  nancial 
strength and the factors that support it. Naturally, 
the ECB’s capital, the ﬁ  nancial buffers to protect 
this capital, and the proﬁ  tability analysed in the 
previous section make a crucial contribution 
to the ﬁ   nancial strength. However, ﬁ  nancial 
strength is not solely composed of the level 
of capital, buffers and proﬁ   ts; it starts with 
legislative provisions dealing with independence, 
capital, reserves, income distribution and loss 
sharing. The ﬁ  nancial strength of a central bank 
and the adequacy of ﬁ  nancial buffers can only be 
assessed in this context. Furthermore, the policy 
objective may affect the ﬁ  nancial strength of a 
central bank.
4.2.1 LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
The Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB 
speciﬁ  es modalities for independence, capital, 
reserves, income distribution and loss sharing:
Article 7 of the Statute grants independence    •
to the central banks of the ESCB and their 
decision-making bodies. Article 14 requires 
that national legislation reﬂ   ect this before 
the country joins and speciﬁ   es that the 
Governing Council may vote by a two-thirds 
majority that other functions performed by 
NCBs interfere with the objectives and tasks 
of the ESCB.
In accordance with Article 28, the ECB    •
started Stage Three of Monetary Union with 
a nominal capital of €5 billion. Furthermore, 
“the capital may be increased by such 
amounts as may be decided by the Governing 
Council acting by qualiﬁ  ed  majority…”. 
The capital was meant to provide income 
through investments to cover operational 
costs of the bank, while at the same time 
offering a buffer.
Article 33 deals with the allocation    •
of net proﬁ   ts and losses of the ECB: 
“… an amount to be determined by the 
Governing Council, which may not exceed 
20% of the net proﬁ  t, shall be transferred 
to the general reserve fund subject to a 
limit equal to 100% of the capital; the 
remaining net proﬁ  t shall be distributed to 
the shareholders of the ECB in proportion to 
their paid-up shares. In the event of a loss 
incurred by the ECB, the shortfall may be 
offset against the general reserve fund of the 
ECB and, if necessary, following a decision 
by the Governing Council, against the 
monetary income of the relevant ﬁ  nancial 
year in proportion and up to the amounts 
allocated to the national central banks …”.
The legislation implies ﬁ  nancial strength by:
providing independence to the ECB    •
(and NCBs) and protecting them from quasi-
ﬁ  scal costs. It also protects the banks from 
automatic proﬁ   t distribution or excessive 
proﬁ  t transfers to stakeholders/governments, 
which would weaken the ﬁ  nancial position. 
foreseeing capital and the right to build up    •
provisions, which supports the ECB position 
further. 
improving transparency on income    •
distribution and losses, and the way 
recapitalisation could take place. This 
transparency contributes to the bank’s 
credibility.
In addition, the ESCB accounting rules and 
particularly the principle of prudence prevented 
the ECB from incurring even greater losses 
in periods of depreciating reserve currencies 
through the use of revaluation accounts to 
record unrealised gains. Setting up general 
provisions against the risks, to which the ECB is 
most exposed, is also allowed by the accounting 
framework in place. In this way, the ﬁ  nancial 
strength of the ECB is signiﬁ  cantly enhanced. 
As can be concluded from the analysis by 
Stella and Lonnberg (2008), however, the 
content of such legislation should be balanced. 
Attempts to regulate everything a priori may be 
counterproductive. If it is stipulated, for example, 33
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STRENGTH that losses will be automatically covered by the 
shareholders, then this would lack credibility as 
there is no guarantee that the shareholder would 
always “stand behind” the bank. In the ECB’s 
case, a decision of the Governing Council is 
explicitly required to use Eurosystem monetary 
income to cover losses. 
Ize (2007) concluded that weak central 
banks typically operate in smaller and less 
wealthy countries, and are burdened by large 
non-performing assets, compulsory transfers 
and low capital. This result suggests that there 
are scale effects, but more importantly it clearly 
indicates the presence of weak legislative 
provisions since the banks have been forced into 
quasi-ﬁ  scal operations (non-performing assets), 
have poor income distribution rules (compulsory 
transfers) and little support (low capital). 
4.2.2 FINANCIAL BUFFERS
Apart from the legislative provisions, the way 
the capital and buffers are handled by the central 
bank is a second important component of the 
bank’s  ﬁ   nancial strength. This represents the 
more visible part of ﬁ  nancial strength. 
If the institutional environment is favourable 
and based on solid legislative provisions, then – 
in theory – the level of capital and buffers at a 
given point in time can afford some ﬂ  exibility. 
The reason is that a central bank in this setting 
will generate enough income in the long run to 
offset negative results. A temporarily weaker 
position of the central bank does not necessarily 
mean that government inﬂ  uence or monetisation 
are near. Bindseil et al. (2004) present simulation 
results on these issues and conclude that in 
practice positive capital seems to remain a key 
tool to ensure that independent central bankers 
always concentrate on price stability.
The capital and ﬁ  nancial buffers still play an 
important role, because a weaker ﬁ  nancial 
position can still raise uncertainty about a 
central bank’s willingness to take more losses 
and confront its shareholder. Concerns about 
a central bank’s willingness to act may have 
consequences at the macroeconomic level. 
Therefore, it is better to maintain a fair (positive) 
amount of capital and protect it with ﬁ  nancial 
buffers to avoid credibility problems. The rare 
cases of central banks that run a negative capital 
position without further implications maintained 
their credibility thanks to other supporting 
factors (like expectations of strong future income 
or a ﬁ  nancially  strong  ﬁ   scal counterpart; see
e.g. Frait (2005)). At the same time, however, the 
discussion in the literature on capital adequacy is 
ongoing and it remains hard to quantify adequate 
capital. The different ﬁ   nancial structures of 
central banks also render comparison difﬁ  cult, 
which implies that the conclusions drawn here 
for the ECB do not necessarily reﬂ  ect on other 
central banks, e.g. the Federal Reserve, which 
has typically had a lower capital base than the 
ECB but cannot be seen as ﬁ  nancially weak(er). 
The situation during the ﬁ  nancial crisis would 
make this judgement even harder, because some 
central banks provided new or different means 
of ﬁ  nancial support to their banking system on 
behalf of their governments. 
The ECB has clearly stated its intention to 
protect its initial capital. As discussed in 
Sub-section 3.2, the ECB made use of both 
reserves and provisions to protect its capital. 
During the 11-year period, the setting-up of a 
special provision has been especially beneﬁ  cial 
to the ECB.
4.2.3 POLICY OBJECTIVE AND SEIGNIORAGE
The  ﬁ   nancial strength of the central bank is 
supported by the right to print money, which 
is a reliable future income source not included 
in the balance sheet. Therefore, the accounting 
capital and ﬁ  nancial buffers are often seen as 
incomplete measures of the ﬁ  nancial  strength 
of a central bank. In general, implicit liabilities 
(e.g. ﬁ  nancial stability events) and assets (e.g. the 
right to issue currency) are not recorded in 
typical accounting frameworks. These potential 
income and expenditures could, however, easily 
dwarf existing balance sheet items.
Although, in theory, the steering of seigniorage 
income could support the ﬁ  nancial  position 
to a great extent, it is usually restricted by the 34
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presence of a nominal policy objective (price 
stability) that prohibits printing money solely 
to support the ﬁ  nancial position. Therefore, if 
it is unlikely that the central bank will abandon 
its inﬂ  ation target, then the seigniorage income 
becomes endogenous and the potential to steer 
seigniorage cannot be taken as ﬁ  nancial strength. 
This also holds for the ECB. Although this 
endogenous seigniorage is smaller, it provides 
a reliable income source in the long run that 
supports the ﬁ  nancial strength. Furthermore, in 
the euro case, practical experience has shown 
a consistently growing banknote demand while 
the policy stance changed a number of times 
(see Chart 9), and one may therefore wonder 
whether banknote demand could be steered 
easily, if at all.
4.3  RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL POSITION 
OF THE ECB
As the analysis in the previous sections 
indicated, the ﬁ  nancial position of the ECB is 
confronted with a number of external risks that 
test its ﬁ  nancial strength. The most important 
risk factors of a central bank are discussed 
below, as e.g. also presented in Cukierman 
(2010), and are related to the experience of the 
ECB. In particular, the consequences of a drop in 
seigniorage, ﬁ  nancial market developments and 
ﬁ  nancial stability expenditures are discussed.
4.3.1 BANKNOTE DEMAND AND DISINFLATION
Persistently low seigniorage would be a 
problem, but is currently of no threat to the 
ECB. If seigniorage permanently falls due to 
a drop in the demand for banknotes, then this 
undermines the ﬁ  nancial strength of the central 
bank. As pointed out by Martinez-Resano 
(2004), this presents a real threat to ﬁ  nancial 
strength, because it undermines the long-term 
potential income. At the moment, the demand 
for euro banknotes is strong and there is no 
such risk, despite the appearance of electronic 
payment tools (see Section 3).
However, the successful implementation 
of monetary policy, by bringing inﬂ  ation 
and nominal interest rates down to low 
levels, implied a moderation of seigniorage. 
As seigniorage still brings a reliable income in 
the long run, this is less of a threat. In the short 
run, however, it does mean that seigniorage can 
become very low when the nominal interest rate 
approaches zero during a recession.
4.3.2 FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
Financial market developments can erode the 
ﬁ   nancial position through write-downs on 
the foreign reserve holdings and own funds. 
Signiﬁ  cant foreign exchange positions of major 
central banks cannot be hedged, because this 
would inﬂ  uence the market through the size 
of the position and the foreign currencies are 
meant to be available in case of intervention 
needs. Although negative results purely due 
to price movements are often temporary 
and tend to revert, they may push an already 
troubled ﬁ  nancial position across the threshold 
where a recapitalisation becomes necessary. 
Furthermore, as Stella and Lonnberg (2008) 
point out, global capital ﬂ  ows have increased 
over time more than the increase in the size of 
central bank balance sheets, thereby increasing 
their leverage. The risk from ﬁ  nancial 
market developments has therefore increased 
over time. 
As the ECB holds a large amount of (unhedged) 
foreign exchange reserves, foreign exchange 
rate risk is the most important risk factor 
(see e.g. the Value-at-Risk charts in the ECB 
Annual Report and the discussion in the 
previous sections). This type of exposure differs 
enormously across central banks around the 
world and depends on their policy objectives 
and tasks in this regard. 
Interest rate risk may weigh on ECB income, 
in particular through the “interest rate gap”. 
The higher euro area interest rates are, the higher 
the expense related to the euro-denominated 
ECB liability for the transfer of foreign 
reserves is. The lower rates are in the United 
States and Japan, the less foreign exchange 
investments earn. When euro rates are high 
and foreign rates are low at the same time, then 
the interest rate gap depresses ECB income. 35
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STRENGTH However, the interest rates and the gap are 
linked to the business cycles of the respective 
economies and therefore it is less likely that a 
gap persists over a prolonged period of time. 
Moreover, the business cycles of trading partner 
countries are often correlated, thereby reducing 
the size of the gap. 
The higher euro area rates are, the higher 
seigniorage is (given a certain demand for 
banknotes) and the higher the expense on the 
NCB claim due to the transfer of foreign reserve 
assets is. Seigniorage and the foreign exchange 
expense will hence partly offset each other for a 
given change in euro area interest rates. As the 
amount of banknotes has grown strongly over 
time, however, seigniorage has grown more 
strongly than the foreign exchange expense, 
which is based on the ﬁ  xed amount of the initial 
foreign exchange transfer. As shown in the 
proﬁ  t and loss account table in the Appendix, 
seigniorage reached €2,230 million in 2008, 
while the foreign exchange expense amounted 
to €1,400 million.
4.3.3 FINANCIAL INSTABILITY
Episodes of ﬁ   nancial instability increase the 
risk for the central bank in its role as lender of 
last resort. Related shocks and policy decisions 
typically increase the size of a central bank’s 
balance sheet and thereby increase the risk to 
the bank’s position. In the case of the ECB, 
the 2008 ﬁ  nancial crisis inﬂ  ated the ECB and 
Eurosystem balance sheets strongly as a result 
of the larger liquidity operations. However, as 
the ECB only acted as an intermediary between 
the NCBs and central banks outside the euro 
area, these operations posed little extra risk to 
the ECB.
The NCBs ran most of the risk since they 
provided the liquidity to their counterparties. 
In case the counterparty defaults, their risk 
stems from the collateral received in the 
reﬁ   nancing operations during episodes of 
market stress. In this case, they receive 
collateral on a much greater scale, of an on 
average lower quality and at a time when the 
markets in which the collateral trades become 
less liquid. Up to mid-2009, ﬁ  ve counterparties 
defaulted on their liquidity operations with 
the NCBs. Provisions were created to cover 
potential related losses.
The risk associated with the absorption of 
excess liquidity in the aftermath of a banking 
crisis appears contained for the Eurosystem. 
Historically, such operations proved costly to 
central banks when they needed to issue debt 
to absorb liquidity, because the interest they 
owe on these securities may be higher than 
the interest earned on the assets. In normal 
times, the short-term Eurosystem reﬁ  nancing 
operations allow a relatively quick decrease in 
outstanding liquidity as they expire. However, 
the increase in the maturity of the operations 
(up to one year), as a response to the intensifying 
ﬁ  nancial crisis, has offset this mechanism. Still, 
liquidity-absorbing operations could be launched 
when needed. In case the exit would require the 
liquidation of collateral, potential losses may 
materialise. The ECB is not directly involved in 
the liquidity provision and hence does not incur 
this risk directly. 
As mentioned in Sub-section 3.4.3, the ECB 
covered bond purchases do give rise to credit 
risk for the ECB, but at the same time it beneﬁ  ts 
from higher yields on those instruments and 
from the fact that it now holds a larger share of 
its assets in euro-denominated securities.
Following  ﬁ   nancial crises, non-performing 
assets and obligations of ﬁ  nancial institutions 
are often assumed by the state. The state 
also often provides rescue loans and ﬁ  nances 
restructuring. If such bailouts are (partly) 
ﬁ   nanced by the central bank instead of the 
government budget, then this increases the 
risk considerably of ending up with non-
performing loans eroding the ﬁ  nancial strength 
of the central bank. Dalton and Dziobek (2005) 
discuss central bank losses due to activities that 
go beyond the conventional central banking 
functions. Up to mid-2009, the ECB had not 
engaged in such quasi-ﬁ  scal operations. 36
ECB
Occasional Paper No 111
May 2010
During ﬁ  nancial crises, markets often move in the 
same direction, thereby increasing correlations. 
The higher correlations will also be felt on the 
central bank balance sheet, with extra liquidity 
operations, lower interest rates, lower inﬂ  ation 
and asset market volatility coinciding and all 
increasing the risk to the ﬁ  nancial position of the 
central bank. At a global level, ﬁ  nancial markets 
have grown and made contingent liabilities 
larger, hence increasing the leverage and risk 
for a lender of last resort.
By contrast, Ize and Oulidi (2009) found 
balance sheet volatility to be a good predictor 
of proﬁ  tability, suggesting that the more active 
central banks – or central banks operating in 
more turbulent macroeconomic environments – 
become more exposed to extraordinary gains 
and losses. This suggests that if the risks do 
not materialise the central bank can be left 
with a (unintended) proﬁ  t despite the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis. In the same sense, ﬁ  nancial  turmoil 
can be devastating for the relationship with 
governments, but it can also be an opportunity 
to afﬁ  rm an existing healthy relationship or for 
new cooperation. 
In the case of the Eurosystem, there were 
write-downs, but also proﬁ  ts during the crisis. 
In particular, the NCBs earned income on 
the surplus of liquidity that banks kept with 
the Eurosystem during the ﬁ  nancial  crisis. 
Eurosystem counterparties obtained euro 
liquidity at the MRO rate, but the surplus that 
was placed back with the Eurosystem overnight 
is only remunerated at the lower deposit rate. 
This behaviour of counterparties likely reﬂ  ected 
an unusually strong preference for liquidity 
which induced an expanded intermediary 
function of the Eurosystem, meaning a higher 
proﬁ  t but also higher risks.37
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This paper has analysed trends in 11 years of 
ECB  ﬁ   nancial accounts. Three main drivers 
of the balance sheet items and proﬁ  t and loss 
account items have been identiﬁ  ed and analysed: 
ﬁ   nancial market developments and reserve 
management;  ﬁ   nancial turmoil and related 
liquidity operations (in foreign currency); and 
banknote issuance. Furthermore, an assessment 
of the ﬁ  nancial strength of the ECB has been 
made based on these accounts and ﬁ  ndings in 
the literature.
1. The analysis of the drivers of the balance 
sheet items came to the following ﬁ  ndings. 
First,  ﬁ   nancial market developments were 
identiﬁ   ed as an important factor leading 
to signiﬁ   cant revaluations of the foreign 
reserve assets and reserve management had a 
signiﬁ  cant impact on the size of the positions. 
A decomposition of the changes in the foreign 
reserve holdings into exchange rate and volume 
effects was carried out. Prominent volume 
effects were the foreign exchange market 
intervention of 2000, gold sales during 2005-09 
and the gradual rebalancing in favour of the 
yen portfolio. Important developments among 
the exchange rate effects were the long period 
of US dollar and Japanese yen depreciation, 
the strong rise in the gold price, and the strong 
Japanese yen appreciation in 2008. Although 
movements in the components of the foreign 
reserve portfolio changed the total value 
of the portfolio, the developments in assets 
occasionally offset each other, e.g. the gold 
price increase helped to offset the effect of the 
US dollar depreciation in the second half of 
the period. Furthermore, the use of revaluation 
accounts has been discussed. These proved 
useful by preventing temporary valuation gains, 
especially on the US dollar holdings, from being 
taken as proﬁ  t and distributed. Concerning the 
own funds portfolio, a strong expansion has been 
observed, which was mainly driven by inﬂ  ows 
from the investment of the bank’s reserves. As a 
second driver, the liquidity operations in foreign 
currency, which the ECB undertook with 
non-euro area central banks during the 2007-
09 ﬁ  nancial crisis, tripled the size of the ECB 
balance sheet during 2008. This resulted mainly 
from the fact that the amounts corresponding 
to the euro leg of US dollar swaps between the 
Federal Reserve and the ECB and between the 
ECB and the NCBs were not paid, but kept as 
liabilities and claims by the banks involved. 
A third driver was the ECB banknote issuance, 
which became a balance sheet item in 2002. 
The banknote issuance followed the strong 
demand for euro banknotes, leading to a gradual 
expansion of the balance sheet over time.
2. The analysis of the proﬁ  t and loss account 
showed that ECB income and expenses 
have been driven by the same three factors: 
seigniorage, ﬁ  nancial market developments and 
portfolio management, and ﬁ  nancial instability. 
These drivers help to explain the series of 
both annual proﬁ   ts and losses that the ECB 
made. Firstly, seigniorage, which depends on 
banknote demand and the marginal MRO rate, 
is an important component of ECB income. 
The strong demand for banknotes increased 
the potential income, but the dynamics in 
seigniorage to a large extent depended on the 
marginal MRO rate. Therefore, seigniorage 
contributed strongly to interest income towards 
the end of the period, reaching €2,230 million in 
2008, but fell signiﬁ  cantly in 2009. Secondly, 
ﬁ   nancial market developments and portfolio 
management had an important impact on the 
ﬁ  nancial result. Exchange rate developments led 
to write-downs on the foreign reserve assets, in 
particular during 2003-04 and 2007, by between 
€2 billion and €4 billion each time. The foreign 
exchange market intervention to support the euro 
exchange rate in 2000 and the gold sales during 
2005-09 brought the biggest realised gains. 
Furthermore, investment earnings on the foreign 
reserve assets are an important income source, 
and hence interest rate developments are an 
important factor. The big share of US dollars in 
the portfolio and the, on average, higher interest 
rates made the US interest rates a dominant 
factor, albeit less so at the end of the period. 
As the ECB also pays euro area interest on its 
foreign reserves, the associated interest rate gap 
determines the net interest income from foreign 38
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reserves. The liability corresponds to the foreign 
reserves transferred by the NCBs. Thirdly, the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis is identiﬁ  ed as a factor that can 
weigh on the ECB ﬁ  nancial result. The impact 
has been minor up to the end of 2009, but the 
ﬁ  nal outcome will depend on the further course 
of the crisis and actions taken. On the one hand, 
a temporarily low seigniorage income as a result 
of low interest rates seems unavoidable. On the 
other hand, the crisis has triggered favourable 
revaluations (of exchange rates and bond prices) 
whose revaluation accounts act as a buffer 
outside the proﬁ  t and loss account. The extra 
liquidity operations had as good as no impact on 
the ﬁ  nancial result.
A number of ﬁ  nancial buffers are in place to 
cover losses. Revaluation accounts act as a ﬁ  rst 
buffer per asset by preventing unrealised gains 
from being taken as income. If these accounts 
do not sufﬁ  ce, then losses are offset against the 
risk provision and ﬁ   nally against the general 
reserve. Together, these buffers protected the 
ECB paid-up capital well, except in 2004 when 
the reserve and provision did not sufﬁ  ce and left 
a loss due to write-downs on the foreign reserve 
portfolio. The remaining loss was offset against 
Eurosystem monetary income, following a 
Governing Council decision. The latter also 
occurred in 1999 when no provisions were in 
place. Looking at the smoothing function of the 
reserve and provision, the provision was more 
important, partly because it can be built up 
faster. The buffers prevented a big loss in 2003, 
but had to absorb a smaller loss in 2004. In 2008, 
the risk provision reached its upper limit of 
€4,020 million for the ﬁ  rst time and remained 
at this limit in 2009. The big write-downs of the 
past indicate, however, that this provision may 
be challenged again in the future, in particular if 
the dollar were to depreciate strongly.
3. The ﬁ   nancial strength of the ECB was 
assessed  based on the previous analysis and 
results found in the literature. The question 
was asked why the ECB needs ﬁ  nancial 
strength and whether analysing accounts and 
maintaining ﬁ  nancial buffers are only relevant 
at the microeconomic level. The answer is that 
the ECB, like other central banks, requires 
ﬁ   nancial strength to credibly commit to a 
given nominal policy objective and contribute 
in a credible way to other potentially costly 
tasks of the Eurosystem, such as ﬁ  nancial 
stability interventions. Three arguments were 
presented. First, a strong ﬁ  nancial position helps 
the central bank to protect its independence 
from the government, a crucial component of 
its credibility. Second, it avoids the need or 
temptation to resort to printing money solely to 
support its ﬁ  nancial position, an act that would 
conﬂ  ict with the ECB’s price stability objective. 
Third, it avoids doubts about its willingness to 
incur costs that would weigh on its ﬁ  nancial 
position, e.g. to perform, together with the 
NCBs of the Eurosystem, its lender of last resort 
function in case of ﬁ  nancial instability. 
The ECB has remained ﬁ  nancially  strong 
throughout the 11-year period thanks to robust 
legislative provisions and the availability of 
ﬁ  nancial buffers. Since the start of Monetary 
Union, legislative provisions on independence, 
capital, reserves, proﬁ   t distribution and loss 
sharing have contributed to its ﬁ  nancial strength 
by providing ﬁ   nancial independence and 
transparency on the income allocated to the bank. 
The implementation of revaluation accounts 
and the building-up of the general reserve and 
special provision further protected the bank’s 
capital to a great extent. The ﬁ  nancial strength 
is also supported by seigniorage income, which 
still provides a reliable income source in the 
long run, even if the policy objective rules out 
the steering of seigniorage. 
The ﬁ  nancial strength of the ECB has mainly 
been tested by ﬁ  nancial market developments. 
The unhedged foreign reserve positions are 
subject to exchange rate risk, which materialised 
with a number of write-downs. These can lead 
to negative ﬁ   nancial results and call on the 
provision, particularly if they occur in a low 
interest rate environment, i.e. when other income 
is low. In general, although depreciations of 
foreign reserves are often temporary, they could 
push an already troubled ﬁ  nancial  position 
across the threshold where a recapitalisation is 39
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required. The same holds for the impact of the 
interest rate gap (between US and euro rates) 
which can drive the net interest income from 
foreign reserves down and depress the annual 
result. Although such developments weighed 
on the ECB’s proﬁ  t, they posed no real threat 
to the ECB’s ﬁ   nancial strength. Furthermore, 
other important risks to a central bank such 
as a persistent decrease in seigniorage appear 
less of a threat as banknote demand is strong. 
Finally, credit risk associated with Eurosystem 
credit operations remained with the NCBs. 
This risk materialised in late 2008 when 
ﬁ   ve counterparties defaulted on reﬁ  nancing 
operations undertaken by the Eurosystem. 
The Governing Council decided that the NCBs 
should establish their respective shares of a 
provision as a buffer against risks arising from 
collateral provided by these counterparties.40
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APPENDIX
DECOMPOSITION OF THE EURO EQUIVALENT 
OF FOREIGN RESERVE HOLDINGS INTO VOLUME 
AND PRICE COMPONENTS
The decomposition is based on the total 
derivative of the euro equivalent. Let pt be the 
price and qt the volume at time t; it then holds 
for the euro equivalent pt  qt that:
∂ptqt ∂pt ∂qt pt ∂t ∂t ∂t
≈ + qt
The ﬁ  rst term corresponds to the volume effect, 
which in practice can be computed as pt ∆qt. 
The second term is the price effect, qt ∆pt. 
Together the effects approximate the change 
in the euro equivalent ∆(pt  qt). The relationship 
does not hold exactly, because the direct effects 
that a volume change could have on the price 
and a price change could have on volume are 
not taken into account. 
The differences between the left and 
right-hand side of the equation are typically 
small, and are not presented. The market 
intervention in 2000 was an obvious 
exception, because it aimed to affect the 
price by volume changes. By contrast, the 
spreading of gold sales across time aimed 
to avoid any signiﬁ  cant effect on the price. 
The small differences between the left and 
right-hand side suggest that this has worked 
out for most gold sales.
Table 1 ECB balance sheet 1998-2009
(EUR millions)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Assets
Gold and gold receivables 6,957 7,041 7,766 8,058 8,145 7,928 10,065 9,930 10,280 10,664 12,355
Claims denominated 
in foreign exchange 343 44,518 41,300 44,871 40,364 31,605 29,655 34,142 32,502 32,890 63,837 38,750
Claims denominated 
in EUR 3,739 6,540 4,654 4,815 83 475 88 13 4 125 629 2,182
Intra-Eurosystem claims 13,081 9,697 34,150 39,499 43,512 50,364 53,805 71,372 295,117 70,873
Claims related 
to the allocation 
of euro banknotes 28,681 34,899 40,101 45,217 50,259 54,131 61,022 64,513
Other claims within 
the Eurosystem (net) 13,081 9,697 5,468 4,600 3,411 5,147 3,546 17,241 234,096 6,360
Other assets 59 1,468 1,264 911 7,512 6,331 7,393 8,160 9,525 11,376 13,656 13,838
Loss for the year 247 477 1,636
Total 4,142 59,730 67,339 68,061 90,268 86,532 90,212 102,743 105,766 126,043 383,903 137,998
Liabilities
Banknotes in circulation 28,681 34,899 40,101 45,217 50,259 54,131 61,022 64,513
Liabilities denominated 
in EUR 1,382 4,789 1,293 1,264 1,212 1,187 1,699 1,170 15,621 254,951 10,571
Liabilities denominated 
in foreign exchange 4,709 4,803 5,858 5,192 1,452 1,260 856 331 667 1,718 19
Intra-Eurosystem liabilities 
equivalent to the transfer of 
foreign reserves 41,190 39,469 40,497 40,497 40,497 39,782 39,782 39,782 40,042 40,150 40,204
Other liabilities 83 1,540 1,678 1,853 1,493 1,337 1,464 1,964 2,162 2,593 5,213 1,337
Provisions 31 22 2,637 2,803 2,645 87 111 1,028 2,394 2,694 4,039 4,043
Revaluation accounts 1 6,861 7,973 9,429 4,405 2,176 1,921 8,109 5,578 6,169 11,353 10,915
Capital and reserves 4,000 4,027 4,000 4,506 4,870 4,870 4,385 4,089 4,089 4,127 4,137 4,142
Proﬁ  t for the year 28 1,990 1,822 1,220 0 0 0 1,322 2,253
Total 4,142 59,730 67,339 68,061 90,268 86,532 90,212 102,743 105,766 126,043 383,903 137,998
Note: Figures as in corresponding annual report; totals may not add up due to rounding.41
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Table 2 ECB profit and loss account 1998-2009
(EUR millions)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Interest income on foreign 
reserve assets 98 1,515 2,507 1,707 991 541 422 889 1,318 1,355 997 700
Interest income arising from 
the allocation of euro banknotes 
within the Eurosystem 727 698 733 868 1,319 2,004 2,230 787
Other interest income 0 3,357 4,657 2,271 1,965 1,450 1,457 1,794 2,762 4,380 8,431 5,608
Total interest income 98 4,872 7,165 3,979 3,683 2,689 2,612 3,552 5,399 7,739 11,658 7,096
Remuneration of NCBs’ claims 
in respect of foreign reserves 
transferred -913 -1,375 -1,509 -1,141 -808 -693 -710 -965 -1,357 -1,400 -443
Other interest expense -3 -3,205 -4,375 -1,698 -1,547 -1,167 -1,229 -1,572 -2,462 -3,962 -7,877 -5,106
Total interest expense -3 -4,118 -5,750 -3,207 -2,688 -1,975 -1,922 -2,282 -3,427 -5,319 -9,277 -5,549
Net interest income 95 754 1,414 771 995 715 690 1,270 1,972 2,421 2,381 1,547
Realised gains/losses arising 
from ﬁ  nancial operations 22 -265 3,353 1,352 735 525 136 149 475 779 662 1,103
Write-downs on ﬁ  nancial assets 
and positions -22 -605 -1 -109 -277 -3,973 -2,093 -97 -718 -2,534 -3 -37
Transfer to provisions for foreign 
exchange rate and price risks -2,600 109 154 2,569 0 -992 -1,379 -286 -1,339 35
Net result of ﬁ  nancial 
operations, write-downs 
and risk provisions 0 -870 752 1352 612 -879 -1,957 -940 -1,622 -2,042 -679 1,099
Other income and expenses 
from fees and commissions 0 1 22436 1 8 1 1788
Staff costs -30 -61 -80 -97 -120 -130 -161 -153 -161 -169 -174 -187
Administrative expenses -30 -61 -83 -185 -134 -154 -176 -158 -166 -185 -183 -186
Depreciation of tangible 
ﬁ  xed assets -8 -10 -14 -20 -18 -30 -34 -32 -29 -26 -23 -21
Banknote production services -118 -2 -3 -4 -5 -5 -7 -6
Proﬁ  t/loss for the year 28 -247 1,990 1,822 1,220 -477 -1,636 0 0 0 1,322 2,253
Note: Figures as in corresponding annual report; totals may not add up due to rounding.42
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